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COERCED CONFESSIONS AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
BY MICHAEL J. ZYDNEY MANNHEIMER*
Since 1936, the Supreme Court has consistently located the
source of its jurisprudence on coerced confessions by a state criminal
defendant in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
This is completely understandable, as coerced-confession
jurisprudence developed at a time when the Court was loathe to
apply mechanistically particular clauses from the Bill of Rights to the
States. Instead, the Court's practice was to determine whether the
proceedings against the defendant were so lacking in fundamental
fairness as to constitute a breach of the vague dictates of due process.
Yet, more recently, the Court's jurisprudence on the application
of the Bill of Rights to the States has embraced a clause-specific
approach. That is, claims that a state has violated due process are
addressed by the Court in terms of the specific clauses of the Bill of
Rights, nearly all of which are by now applied to the States via the
Fourteenth Amendment, and in the identical fashion as they apply
against the federal government. Thus, in Graham v. Connor,3 the
*Appellate Counsel, Center for Appellate Litigation. J.D. 1994, Columbia Law School.
The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author.
1. Though the terms are fairly interchangeable in the case law and commentary, see,
e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 n.3 (1991), this Article uses the term
"coerced" rather than "involuntary" to describe statements taken from suspects as a result
of certain police conduct. This is because the focus of the jurisprudence has shifted from
whether the statement was made voluntarily in some abstract sense to whether it was the
result of police overreaching or misconduct. See infra Part I.C.
This Article uses the term "confession" to describe any statement taken from the suspect
of a criminal inquiry, regardless of whether the statement is inculpatory or exculpatory, or
whether it would be considered a "confession," an "admission," or some other creature at
common law. Thus, this Article often uses the word "statement" interchangeably with
"confession."
2. "No State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. 490 U.S. 386 (1986).
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Supreme Court ruled that where a specific provision of the Bill of
Rights governs a particular aspect of the criminal process, a person
alleging a constitutional infringement with respect to that aspect can
claim only those rights that inhere in that particular provision. Where
those rights are not sufficiently broad to provide a constitutional
claim, one cannot rely on any vague, background guarantee of due
process to fill in the gap. To put it another way, where a potential
constitutional claim falls within the ambit of a particular right
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, the claim can be only as broad as the
guarantees of that provision.
If the Court is to continue to hold that state action that coerces a
confession from a criminal suspect is a violation of his' constitutional
rights, the Court should at least identify which specific constitutional
provision, if any, is at issue. The prime candidate would seem to be
the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause.! Indeed, many
practitioners, scholars, and judges today would likely point to the
Self-Incrimination Clause as the source of the proscription against
coerced confessions. And it is that Clause upon which the Court
relied on in its landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona,6 which
established a prophylactic rule to guard against the possibility of
coercion in the interrogation room. Obviously, the Miranda doctrine
and the line of cases addressing actual coercion are inter-related.
Since both lines of case law seek to prevent the evil of the use of a
suspect's own words, obtained against his will, to convict him, one
would think that the same constitutional language governs both.
Moreover, in some cases-including Miranda itself and Malloy v.
Hogan,7 where the Court first expressly applied the Self-Incrimination
4. This Article refers to the criminal suspect with exclusive use of the masculine
pronoun because the overwhelming majority of arrested criminal suspects are male. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED'L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 229 (1999) (reporting that 78.2% of all arrestees in the United States in 1999 were
male). Moreover, with respect to the types of crime that one would think are most likely
to induce police to resort to coercive tactics, the percentages are even greater. See id.
(reporting that in 1999, males were arrested for 98.7% of forcible rapes, 92.9% of sex
offenses other than forcible rape or prostitution, 89.9% of robberies, 88.6% of non-
negligent homicides, 87.1% of burglaries, 85.6% of arsons, 80.3% of aggravated assaults,
and 85.6% of violent crimes generally). The reader should, of course, be aware that
female criminal suspects are sometimes subjected to conditions alleged to have produced
coerced confessions. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
5. "No person shall.., be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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Clause against the states-the Court intimated that it is the Self-
Incrimination Clause, incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment, that prohibits the use of the coerced confession at trial.8
Yet the Court has understandably been disinclined to ground
coerced-confession jurisprudence solely in the Self-Incrimination
Clause, even after Graham. After all, the plain terms of the Self-
Incrimination Clause prohibit the prosecution in a criminal case only
from forcing the accused to be "a witness against himself"-that is,
either actually to testify at trial or, in the broader and more common
scenario, to make a statement before trial that is then used against
him at trial. Thus, the violation of the accused's rights under the
Clause takes place if, and only if, the statement is admitted against
him at trial, not at the time when the statement is actually extracted.'
Yet the Court's coerced-confession cases make reasonably clear
that it is not simply the use of such a confession that violates basic
constitutional norms; it is also the extraction of such a confession in
the first place that violates basic notions of fairness embodied in our
Constitution. Thus, to rely solely on the Self-Incrimination Clause as
the basis for a jurisprudence that disfavors the use of coercion to
secure confessions would not only be inconsistent with current law,
but it would also be to read the Constitution in a way contrary to
certain normative judgments about how agents of the state should act,
judgments that virtually all would agree are embodied in the
Constitution itself. °
But where? The answer lies with the Fourth Amendment."
After all, the Fourth Amendment is primarily concerned with
ensuring that government agents act reasonably when they seize a
person suspected of a crime and search for evidence of that crime."
Thus, what the courts have heretofore regarded as a confession
extracted under circumstances violative of due process can also be
seen as a confession that is the result of an "unreasonable" search and
seizure. As this Article will show, under this line of reasoning, the
extraction of a coerced confession from an accused implicates two
8. Id. at 7.
9. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2000-04 (2003).
10. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (holding that the state's
compulsion of a confession by physical torture constituted a wrong so "fundamental" it
was "revolting" to any sense of justice).
11. The Fourth Amendment reads, in part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. See id.
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separate potential constitutional violations. First, in general, when
physical or psychological coercion is used to extract a statement, an
unreasonable search and seizure has taken place in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and the statement and its fruit are excludable
from trial pursuant to the ordinary workings of the exclusionary
rule." Second, if and when that statement is nonetheless introduced
against the defendant at trial, he has been compelled to be a witness
against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 4 By contrast, a
violation of the prophylactic rules set forth in Miranda v. Arizona5 is
never per se unreasonable, so no Fourth Amendment violation takes
place, and no constitutional violation takes place at all unless and
until the unwarned statement is admitted at trial 6 And there might
be occasions in which the use of physical or psychological compulsion
to obtain a confession is reasonable under the circumstances but
constitutes compulsion nonetheless. On those occasions, the
statement may not be admitted at trial, lest the Self-Incrimination
Clause be violated, but not because the police have done anything
"wrong."
Such a reconfiguration would be more consistent with the
Supreme Court's emphasis in its more recent coerced-confession
cases, not on the voluntariness of the confession in some metaphysical
sense, but on whether the confession was obtained through
overreaching by the police, the traditional touchstone of Fourth
Amendment law. In addition, the highly fact-sensitive, case-by-case
determination of whether a confession was freely made or coerced fits
nicely with the Fourth Amendment's focus on reasonableness in light
of all the circumstances. At the same time, the Fourth Amendment's
concept of reasonableness helps give some shape to a jurisprudence
that has suffered from a lack of objective criteria for judges to apply.
Thus, when the courts say that a confession was coerced because of
police overreaching, they are essentially saying that the police
conduct during the seizure of the accused and the search of his mind
for evidence, in light of the circumstances, was unreasonable.
This Article argues that coerced confessions are more
13. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,657 (1961).
14. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897).
15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. Id. at 476-77.
17. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-41 (1966); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515-16 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1944).
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appropriately viewed as both the products of unreasonable searches
and seizures and as instances of compelled self-incrimination (but
only if the statement is admitted at trial) rather than as violations of
more general notions of due process. The Article is predominantly
descriptive rather than prescriptive: The aim is largely to offer an
account of coerced-confession jurisprudence that renders the Court's
current case law in a variety of areas as internally coherent as
possible. Thus, the Article largely takes the current state of the law
as a given, including areas that are rather controversial, such as the
Miranda doctrine and the rule enunciated in Graham.19 As to the
controversies that rage to a greater or lesser extent in these and other
areas, the Article attempts to remain agnostic. On the other hand, it
does offer, in closing, what I regard as a few relatively minor
adjustments to the law that best cohere with this Article's overall
vision. The Article also makes no pretense that its overall theory is
supported by an originalist view of the Fourth Amendment. To the
contrary, I readily concede that it might not have occurred to the
Framers that coerced confessions are a Fourth Amendment issue. I
argue only that this theory is most consistent with both the plain
language of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and current Supreme
Court jurisprudence as a whole.0
Part I of this Article examines the development of the law of
coerced confessions, including Miranda. Part II demonstrates the
erosion of due process as a foundation for the Court's coerced-
confession jurisprudence. After providing a brief historical sketch of
the incorporation debate, this Part introduces the problem posed by
Graham v. Connor. Part III considers and rejects the notion that the
constitutional proscription against coerced confessions resides solely
in the Self-Incrimination Clause, based on both the language of the
Clause and the decline in the emphasis on the reliability-enhancing
justification for the rule against coerced confessions.
18. Scholarly criticism of Miranda is plentiful. See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's
Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174
(1988).
19. For a stinging (and, I believe, not fully justified) criticism of Graham, see generally
Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's "Jot for Jot" Account of Substantive
Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086 (1998).
20. For an excellent criticism of the recent over-use of originalism in Fourth
Amendment adjudication, see David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000). Sklansky argues powerfully that "the new Fourth
Amendment originalism ... should be unattractive even to those generally sympathetic to
originalism." Id. at 1745.
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Finally, Part IV examines the law of unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and proposes that the law of
coerced confessions be seen, at least in part, as a natural outgrowth of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This Part then proposes a Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard to govern the issue of whether
a confession has been coerced, which differs somewhat from current
law. It also addresses some real-world implications of viewing
coerced confessions as a Fourth Amendment issue, especially the fact
that exigent circumstances might sometimes render an otherwise
coercive interrogation reasonable. Finally, this Part explains why, as
under current law, coerced confessions should be treated differently
from un-Mirandized confessions with respect to the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine. However, it argues that, contrary to
current law, an un-Mirandized confession, like a coerced confession,
should not be admissible for impeachment purposes.
I. COERCED CONFESSIONS, THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE, AND MIRANDA
The Court's coerced-confessions jurisprudence developed in
response to the use of physical and psychological coercion to extract
statements from criminal suspects, statements that were then used
against the suspects in criminal prosecutions.21 The Court grounded
this jurisprudence in general notions of due process, the only locus of
constitutional rights against State, as opposed to federal, actors
available at the time the jurisprudence was developed . Even after
the Self-Incrimination Clause was held to be incorporated against the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment," the Court continued to locate
the source of its coerced-confessions jurisprudence in the Due
Process Clause standing alone.2 ' However, after struggling with
idiosyncratic and fact-intensive cases of alleged coercion for thirty
years, the Court announced a prophylactic rule in Miranda,
establishing a conclusive presumption that coercion was present if
certain warnings were not read to, and a waiver obtained from, the
suspect, and, in essence, a concomitant rebuttable but heavy
presumption that coercion was absent if the warnings were read and a
21. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
22. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
23. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,6 (1964).
24. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
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waiver obtained." While Miranda is grounded firmly in the
incorporated Self-Incrimination Clause, the source of the proscription
against coerced confessions continues, at least ostensibly, to be the
Due Process Clause. 6
A. Coerced Confessions and the Due Process Clause
"[F]or the middle third of the 20"' Century [the] cases based the
rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not
exclusively, on notions of due process. 27 It is generally agreed that
the Supreme Court's coerced confession jurisprudence with respect to
state defendants began in 1936 with Brown v. Mississippi.8 In that
case, one defendant, Ellington, confessed to a murder only after he
was twice hanged by the neck from a tree limb and let down, tied to a
tree and whipped, released, and then whipped a second time,
informed by the sheriff's deputy performing the deed that the second
whipping would continue until he confessed. Ellington's two co-
defendants, Brown and Shields, confessed to the murder after they
were laid naked over chairs by the same deputy and whipped with a
leather strap with buckles on it, also being told that the torture would
continue until they confessed.3" The defendants were also told that if
they later attempted to recant their confessions, they would be met
with the same treatment." The next day, two sheriffs were taken "to
hear the free and voluntary confession[s]" of the defendants, which
confessions were eventually admitted into evidence at their trial and
which, indeed, constituted the only evidence of their guilt.
32
25. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,435 (2000).
26. Id. at 434.
27. Id. at 433.
28. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (noting that Brown
"was the first case in which the Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibited the
States from using the accused's coerced confession against him"); accord Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688 (1993); Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard
Miranda? 112 YALE L.J. 447, 477 n.122 (2002); George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional
Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEx. L. REV. 231, 234-35
(1988); Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old
Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 745, 747 (1987); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 867 (1981); Larry J. Ritchie,
Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN.
L. REV. 383,408 (1977).
29. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281-82.
30. Id. at 282.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 283-84.
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The case presented the Court with somewhat of a dilemma. On
the one hand, it was faced with a factual record, largely undisputed,
that "'read[] more like pages torn from some medieval account than a
record made within the confines of a modern civilization which
aspires to an enlightened constitutional government."'33 Yet the most
obvious basis for overturning the convictions-that each defendant
was, in essence, "compelled ... to be a witness against himself" in
violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment-
was all but foreclosed by the Court's prior decision in Twining v. New
Jersey,' which had held that the Self-Incrimination Clause did not
apply to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.
The Court cut the Gordian Knot by relying on the Due Process
Clause simpliciter. It wrote:
the question of the right to withdraw the privilege against self-
incrimination is not here involved. The compulsion to which
[Twining] refer[red] is that of the processes of justice by which
the accused may be called as a witness and required to testify.
Compulsion by torture to extort a confession is a different
matter.35
The Court held that the state's actions were so "revolting to the
sense of justice," and constituted "a wrong so fundamental that [they]
made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered
the conviction and sentence wholly void."36 Thus, the Court held that,
regardless of whether the Self-Incrimination Clause itself is involved,
where a conviction rests upon a confession obtained through violent
means, due process of law has been offended and the conviction
cannot stand.37
In later cases, the Court extended the rule of Brown to cover
confessions extracted through psychological rather than physical
coercion. Thus, in Ward v. Texas, the defendant, "an ignorant
33. Id. at 282-83 (quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)).
34. 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
35. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 286.
37. Id. at 285-86; accord Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) ("Physical
violence or threat of it by the custodian of a prisoner during detention serves no lawful
purpose, invalidates confessions that otherwise would be convincing, and is universally
condemned by law."), overruled by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). See Lawrence
Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J.
449, 451 (1964) (describing rule against coerced confessions as a "due process
requirement").
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negro," was transported "by night and day to strange towns, t[old] of
threats of mob violence, and question[ed] ... continuously." '38 The
Court concluded that, even without regard to the defendant's claim
that he had been beaten, burned, and whipped, the defendant's
confession had been "the product of coercion and duress."39 Indeed,
the focus shifted in later cases to determining whether psychological
coercion occurred, as the "third degree," rather than the "medieval"
practices experienced by the Brown defendants, became the
predominant method of extracting confessions. As the Court wrote
in Blackburn v. Alabama:
[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical, and ... the blood
of the accused is not the hallmark of an unconstitutional
inquisition.... [T]he efficiency of the rack and the thumbscrew
can be matched, given the proper subject, by more sophisticated
modes of "persuasion." A prolonged interrogation of an
accused who is ignorant of his rights and who has been cut off
from the moral support of friends and relatives is not
infrequently an effective technique of terror. °
The test was sometimes articulated as whether the suspect's "will
,,41
was overborne, or whether the confession was "the product of a
rational intellect and a free will. 4 2  No matter how stated, the
standard became whether the confession was voluntary under all the
circumstances, taking into account both the character of the confessor
himself and the police conduct.43  Thus, the Court focused on such
38. 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942).
39. Id.
40. 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (footnote omitted). See also Jackson, 378 U.S. at 389
(1964) ("[P]olice conduct requiring exclusion of a confession has evolved from acts of
clear physical brutality to more refined and subtle methods of overcoming a defendant's
will."); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963) ("These standards are applicable
whether a confession is the product of physical intimidation or psychological
pressure .. ").
41. See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961).
42. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 208.
43. See Stein, 346 U.S. at 185 ("The limits in any case depend upon a weighing of the
circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing.");
accord Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 ("The due process test takes into consideration the
totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and
the details of the interrogation.") (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Joseph D.
Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 880
(1979); Herman, supra note 28, at 743; Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 867.
In at least one case, the police methods alone were deemed to have been coercive without
regard to the subjective characteristics of the suspect. See Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 153-54
(1944) (interrogation for 36 hours straight deemed "inherently coercive"); see also Martin
R. Gardner, Section 1983 Claims Under Miranda: A Critical View of the Right to Avoid
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factors going to police conduct as the length and persistence of the
questioning," whether the suspect was afforded adequate sleep45 and
food,46 whether the suspect was kept isolated from friends, family, and
legal counsel,47 whether the suspect was advised of the right to remain
silent and to have an attorney, 8 whether a request for counsel was
denied, 9 whether the suspect was kept in foreign surroundings,"
whether the suspect was taken before a magistrate,51 whether the
circumstances were imbued with the potential for mob violence or
other extrajudicial punishments,52 any threats made of legal action
involving members of the suspect's family,53  any humiliating
treatment of the suspect at the hands of the police,54 and whether
more sophisticated psychological methods were employed.55 The
Court also took into account the idiosyncratic characteristics of the
suspect himself, such as his educational, intelligence, and socio-
Interrogation, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1281-82 (1993); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435,450-51 (1987).
44. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693 (1993); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 399-401 (1978); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 709, 711-12 (1967); Davis v. North
Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 739, 746-47, 752 (1966); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 52, 55
(1962).
45. See Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1968); Clewis, 386 U.S. at 709,
712; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 622 (1961) (plurality); Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 347 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1954); Stein, 346 U.S. at 185; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53
(1949) (plurality); Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 153.
46. See Greenwald, 390 U.S. at 521; Clewis, 386 U.S. at 709-10, 712; Davis, 384 U.S. at
746; Culombe, 367 U.S. at 622 (plurality); Reck, 367 U.S. at 441; Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560, 567 (1958).
47. See, e.g., Mincey, 437 U.S. at 401; Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349 (1968)
(per curiam); Clewis, 386 U.S. at 712; Davis, 384 U.S. at 744-46; Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503, 504 (1963); Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54-55; Culombe, 367 U.S. at 601 (plurality).
48. See, e.g., Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693-94; Greenwald, 390 U.S. at 520-21; Clewis, 386
U.S. at 710-11; Davis, 384 U.S. at 739, 740-41; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730-31
(1966).
49. See, e.g., Mincey, 437 U.S. at 399; Greenwald, 390 U.S. at 520-21; Johnson, 384
U.S. at 730-31; Haynes, 373 U.S. at 504.
50. See, e.g., Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693; Clewis, 386 U.S. at 709-10; Ward v. Texas, 316
U.S. 547, 551, 555 (1942).
51. See, e.g., Clewis, 386 U.S. at 709; Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 55; Culombe, 367 U.S. at
601, 631-32 (plurality); Reck, 367 U.S. at 441; Payne, 356 U.S. at 567; Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191,197 (1957); Turner, 338 U.S. 62, 64 (1949).
52. See, e.g., Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286-87; Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 401
(1958).
53. See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534; Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 70 (1949).
54. See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 622 (plurality); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 405
(1945).
55. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959); Thomas, 356 U.S. at 401.
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economic levels,56 his age,57 his general physical" and psychological
state, including whether he was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol,59 his prior experience with the criminal justice system,60 and
his race."
When the Court reversed course from Twining,62 and held in
Malloy v. Hogan63 in 1964 that the Self-Incrimination Clause applied
to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, it appeared
that the Court might declare that-Brown notwithstanding-its
coerced-confessions jurisprudence was based on the privilege against
self-incrimination. However, this turned out to be a false start. The
Court in Malloy wrote that the distinction between mere compelled
self-incrimination and "'compulsion by torture to extort a confession'
was soon abandoned" after Brown." The Malloy Court pointed out
that the standard developed in the coerced confession cases was not
whether the agents of the state engaged in "shocking" behavior,65 the
due process standard adopted in such cases as Rochin v. California.6
Rather, the Court wrote, the focus of the inquiry was whether the
56. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286 n.2; Greenwald, 390
U.S. at 519; Clewis, 386 U.S. at 712.
57. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693; Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 52-55; Blackburn, 361 U.S. at
208 n.7; Spano, 360 U.S. at 321.
58. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286 n.2; Mincey, 437 U.S. at
398-99, 401.
59. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286 n.2; Mincey, 437 U.S. at
398; Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36-38 (1967); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 308
(1963).
60. See Clewis, 386 U.S. at 712; Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534; Reck, 367 U.S. at 441;
Spano, 360 U.S. at 321.
61. See Clewis, 386 U.S. at 709; Davis, 384 U.S. at 742; Ward, 316 U.S. at 555;
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238 (1940). In the older cases, race was often used as a
surrogate for educational or socio-economic level, with the fact that a suspect was African-
American uniformly indicating the lower end of any scale. See, e.g., Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at
162 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court always has considered the confessor's strength
or weakness, whether he was educated or illiterate, intelligent or moronic, well or ill,
Negro or white.").
62. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
63. 378 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1964).
64. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6-7 (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936)).
See also Ritchie, supra 28, at 410.
65. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7. But see Fikes, 352 U.S. at 201 (Harlan, J. dissenting)
(arguing that confession not coerced "[i]n the absence of anything in the conduct of the
state authorities which 'shocks the conscience"').
66. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). For a discussion of Rochin, see infra Part IV.A.2.a.
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confession was "free and voluntary., 67  Thus, the Court concluded,
the basis for the coerced-confession cases was a deep and abiding
concern for maintenance of an accusatorial system, whereby a suspect
is not compelled to prove the charges against him "out of his own
mouth,"' a concern ordinarily thought of as driving the proscription
against compelled self-incrimination. In a case decided soon after
Malloy, the Court seemed to meld its coerced-confession
jurisprudence to the now-incorporated Self-Incrimination Clause:
"The standard of voluntariness which has evolved in state cases under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the same
general standard which applied in federal prosecutions-a standard
grounded in the policies of the privilege against self-incrimination.,
61
For a brief period after Malloy, the Justices appeared to disagree
amongst themselves as to whether to continue to ground the Court's
coerced-confession jurisprudence in the Due Process Clause. Thus,
for example, the Court's brief per curiam opinion in Beecher v.
Alabama concluded that "[u]nder the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, no conviction tainted by a confession so
obtained can stand."7  Justice Brennan, however, joined by Chief
67. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7.
68. Id. Even before the incorporation of the Self-Incrimination Clause, when the
notion was gathering momentum on the Court, those who subscribed to this view-
especially Justices Black and Douglas-adverted to the Clause as at least one basis for the
Court's coerced-confession jurisprudence. See Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 51 (Douglas, J.)
(writing that "due process... condemns the obtaining of [coerced] confessions" in part
because of "the element of compulsion which is condemned by the Fifth Amendment");
Leyra, 347 U.S. at 558 n.3 (1954) (Black, J.) ("[C]oerced confessions cannot be admitted as
evidence in criminal trials. Some members of the Court reach this conclusion because of
their belief that the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the states the Fifth
Amendment's ban against compulsory self-incrimination."). This view had previously
made its way into the cases almost exclusively by way of dissent. See Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156, 197-98 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]oday's opinion ... narrow[s] the
scope this Court has previously given the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that no person
'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."), overruled by
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Stein, 346 U.S. at 208 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The practice now sanctioned is a plain violation of the commands of the Fifth
Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, that no man can be
compelled to testify against himself.") (citations omitted).
69. Davis, 384 U.S. at 740; accord Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464 (1966). See also
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) ("Over time, our cases recognized
two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted
into evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485 (1972)
(proscription against coerced confessions protects "the right of an individual ... not to be
compelled to condemn himself by his own utterances").
70. 389 U.S. 35, 38 (1967) (per curiam).
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Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, concurred in the judgment only,
relying solely on "the test of admissibility stated in Malloy."7' And
Justice Black also concurred only in the result (but, curiously, not in
Justice Brennan's separate opinion), "exclusively on the ground that
the confession of the petitioner was taken from him in violation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment ... made
applicable to the States" by Malloy.72
However, the Court eventually, and without significant dissent,
settled back into its old nomenclature and deemed that "any criminal
trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of
due process of law., 73 Indeed, the Court has made it quite clear that
what it had written in Brown-that "[clompulsion ... to extort a
confession is a different matter" from compelled self-
incrimination74 -is still true. It wrote that "even after holding that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies in the
context of custodial interrogations, and is binding on the States, the
Court has continued to measure confessions against the requirements
of due process. ,75
B. The Miranda Revolution 76
Nearly from the beginning of its venture in the field of coerced
confessions, the Court ran into problems. Critics pointed to the
71. Beecher, 389 U.S. at 39 (opinion of Brennan, J.). See also Lego, 404 U.S. at 490
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When the prosecution, state or federal, seeks to put in evidence
an allegedly involuntary confession, its admissibility is determined by the command of the
Fifth Amendment that '(n)o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."') (alterations in original).
72. Beecher, 389 U.S. at 38 (opinion of Black, J.).
73. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398 (emphasis omitted); accord Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434
("We have never abandoned this due process jurisprudence ..."); Withrow, 507 U.S. at
689 ("[W]e continue to employ the totality-of-the-circumstances approach when
addressing a claim that the introduction of an involuntary confession has violated due
process."); Clymer, supra note 28, at 477 nn.122-23.
74. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936).
75. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985). Eight of the nine justices concurred in
the opinion and this statement. See id at 105. The lone dissenter, then-Justice Rehnquist,
did not take issue with it either. See id. at 118-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, in an
opinion the following term authored by now-Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court reiterated
this proposition with approval. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) ("The
Court has retained th[e] due process focus, even after holding... that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies to the States."). But
cf. id. at 182 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Our interpretation of the Due Process Clause has
been shaped by [a] preference for accusatorial practices ....").
76. Credit for this term goes to Professors Kamisar, La Fave and Israel. See YALE
KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 471 (8th ed. 1994).
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indeterminancy of whether a given confession was voluntary, given
that the determination depended entirely on a confluence of factors
that might or might not later convince a court that the confession was
coerced. Aggravating this indeterminancy was the fact that so many
of the factors were idiosyncratic and varied from suspect to suspect.77
Even those who supported the case-by-case character of the Court's
coerced confession jurisprudence had to acknowledge these
difficulties.78
The solution came in the landmark 1966 case of Miranda v.
Arizona.9 In a break with precedent, the Miranda Court grounded its
decision, not in general notions of due process, but in a specific
provision of the Bill of Rights-the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause-to which the Court adverted continuously in
the course of its lengthy opinion." The Court found that, even
regardless of the multitude of factors taken into account in the
totality-of-the-circumstances test, compulsion to speak and possibly
incriminate oneself is "inherent" in the atmosphere of a custodial
interrogation. In response, the Court held that statements taken
under such circumstances could not be used against a criminal
defendant unless procedural safeguards were employed that were
77. See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 455 (1961) (Clark, J., dissenting) (decrying "the
elusive, measureless standard of psychological coercion heretofore developed in this Court
by accretion on almost an ad hoc, case-by-case basis"); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143, 163 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("No one can regard the rule of exclusion
dependent on the state of the individual's will as an easy one to apply."). See also Joseph
D. Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises
Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 48 (1979).
78. See, e.g., Culombe v.Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601 (1961) (plurality) ("It is
impossible for this Court, in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, to attempt precisely to
delimit, or to surround with specific, all-inclusive restrictions, the power of interrogation
allowed to state law enforcement officers in obtaining confessions.").
79. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Gardner, supra note 43, at 1282, 1287, 1307. The word
"solution" is, to say the least, an overstatement, given the controversy Miranda has
generated in the commentary, see, e.g., Grano, supra note 18, at 174, and among various
Members of the Court itself. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444-57
(2000) (Scalia, J. dissenting). I mean to say only that Miranda greatly reduced the
problem of indeterminancy in the Court's coerced-confession jurisprudence. Arguably, it
did so by merely shifting the flaws in that approach to its own separate and, to some,
illegitimate, doctrinal line. See, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 463 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Steven J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to
"Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938, 944 (1987); Schulhofer, supra note 28,
at 879-82.
80. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439, 441-42, 444, 457-58, 460-61, 463, 465, 467, 477, 478.
See also Clymer, supra note 28, at 478.
81. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458, 465,467.
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"effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.,,2
Specifically, it held that for such statements to be admissible, it must
be shown that the suspect was advised of his right to remain to silent,
that anything he says can later be used against him, and his right to an
attorney to be present during questioning, and that he waived these
rights. 3
The Miranda rule thus establishes a conclusive presumption that,
without the appropriate warnings and waiver, any response by a
suspect to custodial interrogation has been "compelled" within the
meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause and therefore cannot be
used against that suspect at trial. ' Concomitantly, in practice though
not expressed doctrinally, the rule establishes another, rebutable
presumption that if the appropriate warnings have been given and a
waiver obtained, any resulting statement is constitutionally
admissible.85
Yet, while Miranda overtook the Court's jurisprudence on
coerced confessions, it did not supplant it. Courts must still
82. Id. at 444. See also id. at 457-58, 476-79.
83. See id. at 444, 479.
84. See id. at 535 (White, J., dissenting); Herman, supra note 28, at 736; Schulhofer,
supra note 43, at 446-53; see also Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal
Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100, 106-11, 154, 160
(1985). Even after Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000), this conclusive
presumption is still properly characterized as "prophylactic," in the sense that it sweeps
more broadly than is necessary to preserve the constitutional right at issue. It is true that
Dickerson confirmed that Miranda states a constitutional rule. Id. at 438. It is also true,
however, that the Dickerson Court did not back away from the characterization of that
rule as "prophylactic." For example, the Court cited with approval the following passage
from Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993): "'Prophylactic' though it may be, in
protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda
safeguards a 'fundamental trial right."' Dickerson, 530 U.S at 440 n.5. It also noted: "The
disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no means
involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his 'rights,' may nonetheless be
excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result." Id. at 444. That is, the rule is
prophylactic. Members of the Court continue to disagree over this designation. Compare
Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2003 (2003)(plurality)(describing Miranda rule as
"prophylactic") with id at 2012 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)("[T]he Court disavowed the 'prophylactic' characterization of Miranda in
[Dickerson].")
85. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) ("Cases in which a
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was
'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of
Miranda are rare."); see also Clymer, supra note 28, at 514 ("[A]dherence to Miranda all
but guarantees admission of a suspect's statement."); Markman, supra note 79, at 945 ("As
a matter of common sense, it is more difficult for a defendant to establish that he was
forced to confess if he was told explicitly before questioning that he did not have to say
anything.").
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determine whether a confession was actually coerced even where the
dictates of Miranda have been satisfied, notwithstanding the
rebuttable presumption."6 For example, if the police read a suspect
his rights and he waives them, but the police then proceed to subject
him to treatment of the Brown variety, there is little doubt that a
court should determine that any resulting confession was coerced.
Likewise, courts must still determine whether a confession was
actually coerced in cases where Miranda does not apply, such as
instances of non-custodial interrogation. 7 Thus, early reports of the
death of coerced-confession jurisprudence were greatly exaggerated."
The Court continues to maintain two distinct though related doctrinal
lines to deal with two distinct but related phenomena: "actual"
coercion and "presumed" coercion.
C. "Actual" Coercion and "Presumed" Coercion
Though they obviously are related, the Court has treated
"actual" coercion cases differently from "presumed" coercion (i.e.,
Miranda) cases in several important respects. For example, a
statement that is the result of actual coercion can never be used to
impeach a testifying defendant at trial." On the other hand, a
statement that is only presumptively coerced, because un-
Mirandized,' ° can be used for impeachment purposes, if the statement
is otherwise reliable. 9"
Furthermore, although it appears that the Court has never
expressly said so, 2 it has assumed that the "tainted fruit of the
86. See Dix, supra note 28, at 243; Grano, supra note 43, at 865 n.33; Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat, 26
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 15-16 (1986).
87. See Grano, supra note 77, at 47-48; Grano, supra note 43, at 865 n.33; Herman,
supra note 28, at 752 n.147; Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 877.
88. Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 877-78.
89. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978).
90. The terms "un-Mirandized" and "unwarned" refer to statements taken either
without all the warnings prescribed by Miranda or without a valid waiver. This Article
avoids using terms like "Miranda violation" for reasons that will become apparent. See
infra text accompanying notes 333-35, 363-66. See also Clymer, supra note 28, at 450-51
n.9.
91. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 224-26 (1971); Clymer, supra note 28, at 505-07.
92. See Massachusetts v. White, 439 U.S. 280 (1978) (affirming by an equally divided
Court); Commonwealth v. White, 371 N.E.2d 777 (Mass. 1977) (excluding physical
evidence that is fruit of un-Mirandized statement); Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S.
922, 923 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that the question is
an open one); Akhil Reed Amar & Ren6e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles:
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poisonous tree" doctrine applies with full force to a confession that is
the result of actual coercion. That is, if a suspect's actually coerced
statement leads police to physical evidence or to information
regarding a witness, that evidence or witness's testimony must be
suppressed as well as the confession itself as the "secondary fruit" of
the coercive treatment. This appears to be the underlying assumption
in cases like Oregon v. Elstad93 and Michigan v. Tucker,94 as well as in
the opinions of several of the Justices who have written separately on
the subject.95
On the other hand, where a statement is merely un-Mirandized,
the statement itself is excluded but its fruits, generally speaking, are
not. Thus, in Tucker, a suspect was subjected to custodial
interrogation after being given warnings that deviated from those
prescribed in Miranda.96 In his resulting statement, he disclosed the
identity of an individual who, ultimately, would give damning
testimony at trial.' The Supreme Court held that the admission of
this testimony was proper even though the defendant's statement
itself was constitutionally inadmissible. 98 Likewise, in Elstad, where
the purported "fruit" was a second confession of the defendant
following one that was not preceded by Miranda warnings, the Court
held the "fruit" admissible even though the original confession was
not.' The Court has not addressed whether the third variety of fruit
that can be disclosed by an un-Mirandized statement-physical
The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 917 n.265 (1995).
93. 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985) ("There is a vast difference between the direct
consequences flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or other
deliberate means calculated to break the suspect's will and the uncertain consequences of
disclosure of a 'guilty secret' freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive
question .. "); see also id. at 309 ("It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that
a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or
other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will,
so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is
ineffective for some indeterminate period.").
94. 417 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1974) (noting that circumstances of un-Mirandized
statements "are a far cry from" those of statements coerced in the classic sense).
95. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (noting that in several common-law jurisdictions outside the
United States, fruits derived "from all confessions 'not blatantly coerced' are admissible).
96. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 436.
97. See id. at 436-37.
98. See id. at 446-52.
99. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308-09. It appears that the Court will soon re-visit this issue.
See Missouri v. Seibert, 123 S.Ct. 2091 (2003), granting certiorari to 93 S.W. 3d 700 (Mo.
2002).
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evidence-should be exempt from suppression. Justice 0' Connor
has embraced this view, ' ° as have most federal circuit courts to
address the issue.10' Thus, it appears that the fruits of a
"presumptively coerced" confession generally are constitutionally
admissible while the fruits of an "actually coerced" confession are
not."
D. The Focus on Police Over-Reaching
The final wrinkle the Court has added to its coerced-confession
jurisprudence is the requirement that the confession be not simply
involuntary in some abstract or metaphysical sense, but that it be the
product of official misconduct or overreaching. This change came
just as the Court was reaffirming the due process basis for its coerced
confession jurisprudence,"°3 in the 1986 case of Colorado v.
100. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
101. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 882-83 (noting that fruits of un-Mirandized
statements can generally be used at trial); Ritchie, supra note 28, at 416 (same). A circuit
split has developed on this issue in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000). Compare United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d
1013, 1019-29 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 1788 (2003)(holding that, after
Dickerson, physical evidence discovered as result of un-Mirandized confession must be
suppressed) with United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 92-94 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding
that physical evidence discovered as result of deliberate decision not to administer
Miranda warnings or obtain waiver must be suppressed, but not where police negligently
failed to do so), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Oct. 7, 2002), and with
United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir.) (adhering to pre-Dickerson circuit
precedent declining to suppress physical fruit of un-Mirandized confessions), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 931 (2002), and United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2001)
(same), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1028 (2002). Patane and Faulkingham both relied on the fact
that Dickerson held that the Miranda rule is constitutionally based. See Dickerson, 530
U.S. at 433; Patane, 304 F.3d at 1019; Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 92. But both describe that
constitutional rule as requiring that the warnings be given and a waiver obtained, rather
than requiring that any statement not obtained under those circumstances be excluded
from evidence at trial. Patane, 304 F.3d at 1028 ("The personal right to be free of
government invasions of the privilege against self-incrimination is violated just as surely by
a negligent failure to administer Miranda warnings as by a deliberate failure.");
Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 92 ("Dickerson ... reaffirmed the status of Miranda's warning
requirement as a constitutional rule .... ) (emphasis added). This is mistaken, given that
the Dickerson Court itself described Miranda's "core ruling" thusly: "[U]nwarned
statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief." Dickerson, 530
U.S. at 443-44. The distinction is critical and is explored further infra text accompanying
notes 183-93, 357-75.
It appears that the Supreme Court will resolve this issue next Term. See United States v.
Patane, 123 S.Ct. 1788 (2003), granting cert. to 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002).
102. See Grano, supra note 84, at 110-11; Saltzburg, supra note 86, at 19.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
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Connelly."° Connelly was a chronic schizophrenic who, in a psychotic
state, believed he heard the voice of God tell him to withdraw money
from his bank account and purchase a plane ticket from Boston to
Denver.05 Once in Denver, the voice commanded that he either
confess to the murder of a young girl in Denver the previous year or
commit suicide."° Connelly approached a police officer and made a
full confession. 7 Connelly denied that he had been drinking or using
drugs and, though he admitted that he had been a patient in mental
hospitals in the past, the police did not perceive that he was suffering
from any mental illness at the time."° An expert later testified that
Connelly's "condition interfered with [his] 'volitional' abilities; that is,
his ability to make free and rational choices,"' but that it "did not
significantly impair his cognitive abilities."'"
The Court held that Connelly's confession was properly admitted
into evidence against him at trial, despite the fact that it was literally
"involuntary" because of his psychosis. The Court held that, in
addition to involuntariness, a defendant claiming that a confession
was coerced must show some measure of "coercive police conduct" in
procuring the confession." "[T]he crucial element" to a finding of
coercion, the Court wrote, is "police overreaching": "Absent police
conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for
concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of
due process of law.'' Absent "wrongful acts" by the police or some
other government official, there can be no "'state action' to support a
claim of violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.""'
Thus, several broad conclusions can be drawn about the current
state of the Court's coerced-confession jurisprudence. First, it is
104. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
105. Id. at 161.
106. Id. at 160-61.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 161.
110. Id. at 163-64, 167. Professors Herman and Paulsen presaged this development
decades earlier when they argued that the "voluntariness" terminology obscured the true
nature of the inquiry-the focus on police misconduct. See Herman, supra note 37, at 457-
58; Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 419
(1954).
111. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-64; accord Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693
(1993).
112. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165.
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rather firmly embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Second, the closely related Miranda doctrine is
founded just as surely in the incorporated Self-Incrimination Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Third, to demonstrate coercion, a criminal
defendant must satisfy a threshold showing of police misconduct and
must show that, under the totality of the circumstances, the
confession was involuntary. And finally, with respect to both the
"fruits" doctrine and impeachment, the Court treats coerced
confessions quite differently than it treats un-Mirandized statements,
despite the inter-relatedness of the two doctrinal lines.
II. GRAHAM v. CONNOR AND THE EROSION OF THE
DUE PROCESS FOUNDATION FOR THE RULE
AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS
Although the Court continues to insist that its coerced-
confessions jurisprudence is grounded in due process, recent
developments in the law have severely undercut that assertion.
Specifically, the Court's 1989 decision in Graham v. Connor"'
signaled a sea-change in how the Court views incorporation of the
Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment. In Graham and
its progeny, the Court has insisted that those who claim a deprivation
of constitutional rights identify the specific provision of the Bill of
Rights under which the claim falls, if at all possible. If a particular
claim falls within the rubric of any particular clause of the first eight
amendments, one may state a claim with respect to that provision or
not at all.' The Court has thus rejected the notion that there is a
general background due process protection if the claim should
naturally fall within the ambit of a particular provision of the Bill of
Rights and that provision can afford the claimant no relief. To
understand fully the ramifications of Graham, one must first
understand a little about the incorporation debate that dominated the
Court from the late-1930s, when the notion of incorporation of
particular provisions of the Bill of Rights started to gain momentum,
to the late-1960s, by which time almost every such provision had been
"selectively" incorporated.
A. A (Very) Brief Primer on Incorporation
The provisions of the Bill of Rights, of course, apply only to the
113. 490 U.S. 386 (1986).
114. Id. at 394.
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individual's relationship with the federal government.l It is only by
their incorporation into the Due Process Clause" 6 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868 in the wake of the Civil War, that any of
these provisions apply to the relationship between the individual and
the State. While the determination of which specific provisions of the
Bill of Rights were incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment has largely been settled, the debate within the Court
spanned decades.
A useful starting point, at least for purposes of such a general
discussion, is Justice Cardozo's opinion for the Court in Palko v.
Connecticut."7 There, the Court was presented with the question
whether the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause"8 applied to
the States via the Fourteenth Amendment's general requirement of
due process. The nearly unanimous Court'18 answered the question in
the negative and, in the process, narrowly described the types of
interests protected by the Due Process Clause: only "the specific
pledges of particular amendments [that] have been found to be
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"'2° or those "'so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental,'', 2' or those without which "neither liberty nor justice
would exist.' 22 Cataloging its own jurisprudence, the Court included
in that category some rights specifically protected by the original Bill
of Rights, such as the rights to freedom of speech,23 freedom of124 . • 1251/ 116
press,' the free exercise of religion, peaceable assembly, and, at
115. See, e.g., Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
116. But see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 161-67 (1986) (arguing that Bill of
Rights was incorporated via Privileges and Immunities Clause); Michael J. Mannheimer,
Equal Protection Principles and the Establishment Clause: Equal Participation in the
Community as the Central Link, 69 TEMPLE L. REV. 95, 127-39 (1996) (arguing that
Establishment Clause is best interpreted as having been incorporated via Equal Protection
Clause).
117. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 396 U.S. 784 (1969).
118. "No person shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
119. Justice Butler dissented without opinion. See Palko, 302 U.S. at 329.
120. Id. at 324-25.
121. Id. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
122. Id. at 326.
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least in some circumstances, to the assistance of counsel.27 It also
included several rights not specifically mentioned in the original Bill,
such as the "protection against torture, physical or mental," '128 the
requirement that "condemnation... be rendered only after trial,"2 9
and the mandate that the trial be real and "not a sham or pretense."'3
And it excluded many of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights,
such as the right to be indicted by a grand jury,' the privilege against
self-incrimination,132 the right to a jury trial in both criminal and civil
matters,"' the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures,
and the right to confront one's accusers at trial.' In sum, in 1937, the
Court, almost unanimously, adopted a position of "selective and non-
exclusive" incorporation. That is, some but not all of the Bill of
Rights were incorporated, and the notion of due process included
some protections not in the original Bill at all. The process was
additionally "selective" because a court had to look to the facts of the
particular case to determine whether, in the context of that case, due
process included the particular rights at issue.
A decade later, two additional views had emerged to fragment
the Court, and the three views were on full display in Adamson v.
California .' The narrow issue in that case was whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by a
California law allowing the court and prosecutor to comment on the
defendant's decision not to testify at his trial.3 7 That question was
answered in the negative in an unremarkable opinion by Justice
Reed, which reaffirmed that "[t]he due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment... does not draw all the rights of the federal
127. Id. To these may be added the rights not to have private property taken for a
public purpose without just compensation, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1896), and of an accused to be informed of the charges against him. See Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
128. Palko, 302 U.S. at 326 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)).
129. Id. at 327.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 323 (citing, inter alia, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)).
132. Id. at 323-24 (citing, inter alia, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106, 111-12
(1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964)). See also supra text
accompanying notes 62-69.
133. Palko, 302 U.S. at 324 (citing, inter alia, Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875)).
134. Id. at 323 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)).
135. Id. (citing West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904)). To these may be added the
right to bear arms. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
136. 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled by Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
137. Id. at 48-49.
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Bill of Rights under its protection. '
' 38
It was the concurrence and dissents that contain an exposition of
the various views of incorporation. Justice Black, joined by Justice
Douglas, expressed his view that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the entire Bill of Rights-but only the Bill of Rights. 9
This view can be called "total and exclusive" incorporation. In a brief
dissent, Justice Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, agreed with
Justice Black "that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should
be carried over intact into the... Fourteenth Amendment.'
40
However, he added the proviso that the Fourteenth Amendment
might on occasion require more than simple adherence to the Bill of
Rights:
I am not prepared to say that the [Fourteenth Amendment] is
entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. Occasions
may arise where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to
fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant
constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process
despite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of
Rights. 4 '
This view can be called "total and non-exclusive" incorporation.
Finally, Justice Frankfurter responded to these breakaway Justices by
restating and defending the Palko rule of "selective and non-
exclusive" incorporation: "The [Fourteenth] Amendment neither
comprehends the specific provisions by which the founders deemed it
appropriate to restrict the federal government nor is it confined to
them.
, 142
138. Id. at 53.
139. Id. at 69-92 (Black, J. dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Black had concurred in
Palko without opinion ten years earlier. However, he had been on the Court less than
four months at the time. Compare Palko, 302 U.S. at 319 (decided Dec. 6, 1937) with
EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR., ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1691 (8th ed. 1989) (Justice Black appointed to Court on Aug. 18, 1937). It is likely that
his views on incorporation had not yet fully developed.
140. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It does not appear that any Justice has
embraced the remaining alternative in our ad hoc Punnett square: "selective and
exclusive" incorporation. Arguably, a coherent defense of such a view could be conjured
if, for example, one otherwise agreed with Justice Black but an analysis of a specific
provision of the Bill of Rights reveals that incorporation would be a logical impossibility,
as some have argued with respect to the Establishment Clause. See William K. Lietzau,
Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1206-07 (1990). See also Mannheimer, supra note 116 (refuting
this view). Indeed, even Justice Black's view is, technically speaking, "selective and
exclusive" incorporation, given that not even he advocated incorporation of the Ninth and
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The Frankfurter "selective and non-exclusive" view of
incorporation held sway and, at least nominally, still does. Yet, it
eventually became apparent that Justice Black, and especially Justice
Murphy, had lost the Adamson battle but won the incorporation war.
By the end of the Warren Court era, the Court no longer looked to
the facts of the particular case to determine whether the specific
provision at issue was incorporated with respect to the circumstances
of that case. Each provision was either "in" or "out," completely and
for all cases. And they were mostly "in": with a few outlier
exceptions like the Second Amendment,'43 the Grand Jury Clause of
the Fifth Amendment,'" and the Seventh Amendment, nearly every
provision in the Bill of Rights had been applied against the States.
46
Incorporation now is so complete, and the vague concept of
"fundamental fairness" rendered so marginally relevant as a doctrinal
matter, that a plurality of the Court recently wrote that the Court has
"substituted... the specific guarantees of the various provisions of
the Bill of Rights ... for the more generalized language contained in
the earlier cases construing the Fourteenth Amendment.', 47 Indeed,
the Court often avoids even "going through the motions" and stating
an issue in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Court
Tenth Amendments.
143. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1I ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265(1886) (holding that Fourteenth
Amendment does not incorporate Second Amendment).
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ....");
Hurtado v. California 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment does
not incorporate Grand Jury Clause).
145. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law."); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875)
(holding that Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate Seventh Amendment).
146. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969) (Double Jeopardy
Clause); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968) (Jury Trial Clause); Washington
v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (Compulsory Process Clause); Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213, 225 (1967) (Speedy Trial Clause); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)
(Confrontation Clause); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Self-Incrimination Clause);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (Assistance of Counsel Clause);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,660 (1961) (Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule).
See also supra text accompanying notes 123-35 (discussing specific provisions incorporated
as of 1937).
147. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality).
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often will ask whether the State has violated the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, or Eighth Amendment.
1 48
At the same time, the Court has recognized a whole host of pure
due process rights not grounded in any specific provision of the Bill of
Rights. For example, it is a violation of due process for a State: to
knowingly utilize perjured testimony in order to secure a conviction;
to withhold crucial exculpatory information from the defendant;5 ° to
base a conviction on a witness identification that resulted from an
unduly suggestive pre-trial identification procedure;' 5 ' to have guilt
adjudicated by a finder of fact, who is interested in the outcome or
otherwise partial; to exclude a defendant from attending his own114 155
trial"'53 to rely, in summation or on cross-examination, on matters
so unduly prejudicial that the factfinder's reasoned analysis of the
evidence has been precluded; and perhaps most famously, to base a
148. Taking the 2001-02 Term as an example, the Court decided 19 cases involving
what were, strictly speaking, Fourteenth Amendment claims. In ten of these-that is,
more than half-the Court cited the incorporated provision but never cited the Fourteenth
Amendment in relation to the claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 857 (2002) (Sixth
Amendment); Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768, 774, 781, 788
(2002) (First Amendment); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737, 738, 742 (2002) (Eighth
Amendment); Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 637, 638 (2002) (per curiam) (Fourth
Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306, 311, 321 (2002) (Eighth
Amendment); Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc. of N.Y. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 153, 160, 162 (2002) (First Amendment); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693, 695 (2002)
(Sixth Amendment); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429, 432,
440 (2002) (First Amendment); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164, 165, 169 n.2, 176
(2002) (Sixth Amendment); Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 317, 320-21
(2002) (First Amendment). In three additional cases, the Court cited the Fourteenth
Amendment only when describing a party's allegations or arguments. See Bd. of Educ. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 827 (2002); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 521 (2002); Lee v. Kemna,
534 U.S. 362, 376 n.8 (2002). Moreover, in Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002),
the Court did not cite any provision of the Constitution. Thus, in only five out of the
nineteen cases did the Court give proper credit to the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648, 676 (2002); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,
597 (2002); McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35 (2002); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 661
(2002); Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Counc. v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 307
n.1 (2002). See also Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2008 n.1 (2003)(Scalia, J.,
concurring in part in the judgment)(acknowledging common use of this shorthand by the
Court).
149. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1923).
150. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
151. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
152. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-32 (1927).
153. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
154. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.
637 (1974).
155. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987).
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conviction on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'56
While ostensibly the Court still practices "selective and non-
exclusive" incorporation, the resulting landscape looks more like
Justice Murphy's vision of "total and non-exclusive" incorporation
than anything else. Yet, even after the incorporation debate
subsided, a further question remained. The Due Process Clause
maintains independent vitality in areas where the rest of the
Constitution is silent. This is an aspect of its "non-exclusive"
component. But does that "non-exclusivity" still apply when a factual
scenario is addressed wholly by more specific constitutional text?
That is, what place, if any, does the Due Process Clause have in those
areas covered by more specific constitutional text but where the
specific provision implicated is not broad enough to bestow
constitutional protection?'57
B. Enter Graham
The question was answered in the 1989 case of Graham v.
Connor.18  In that case, the plaintiff had been treated roughly by
police during an arrest and he brought an action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claiming a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights.9 Dismissal of the claim was upheld by the Fourth
Circuit, applying a "substantive due process" standard pursuant to
which the plaintiff had to prove, inter alia, that the officers had acted
"'maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.""6' This was part of the four-part test adopted by "the vast
majority of lower federal courts" in assessing excessive force claims
156. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970).
157. As used in this Article, a governmental action is "covered" by a particular
constitutional provision if that provision is implicated by the action; that is, if some level of
analysis of the provision is required to determine whether the governmental action is
valid. Constitutional "protection" occurs only when that analysis yields the result that the
governmental action is invalid. See Massaro, supra note 19, at 1090. See also FREDERICK
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-90 (1982) (adopting similar
use of terms in First Amendment realm); Michael J. Mannheimer, Note, The Fighting
Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1527 n.5 (1993) (same). The Supreme Court
seems also to have adopted this distinction. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 843 (1998) ("Substantive due process analysis is... inappropriate in this case only if
respondents' claim is 'covered by' the Fourth Amendment.") (quoting United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)).
158. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
159. Id. at 390.
160. Id. at 391 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 827 F.2d 945, 948 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated
by, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
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by both arrestees and pretrial detainees.6'
The Supreme Court rejected this analysis, at least in the case of
arrestees. The Court wrote that, to evaluate constitutional excessive
force claims, one must first "identify[] the specific constitutional right
allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force., 62 The
Court noted that "[i]n most instances, that will be either the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the
person, or the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments, which are the two primary sources of constitutional
protection against physically abusive governmental conduct.',
63
Where "an explicit textual source of constitutional protection"
applies to a given fact situation, that specific constitutional provision,
"not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must
be the guide."' 6 Because the claim in Graham involved an allegation
of excessive force "in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of
a free citizen," the question was whether the seizure was reasonable
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
6 1
Five years later, in Albright v. Oliver,66 a plurality of the Court
not only re-affirmed the Graham rule but also confirmed its
substantial breadth. In that case, State authorities had issued an
arrest warrant for Albright based on an informant's claim to
Detective Oliver that Albright had sold her an illegal "look-alike"
substance. 67 When Albright learned of the warrant, he surrendered
himself and was soon released on bond." Although Oliver testified
at a preliminary hearing that Albright sold the substance to the
informant, this claim later turned out to be unsubstantiated and the
action was dismissed. 69  Albright brought a § 1983 action for
constitutional malicious prosecution, claiming that he was prosecuted
without probable cause in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
161. Id. at 393. Although distinctions are sometimes blurred, it appears that the term
"arrestees" refers, at least, to those who have been arrested but who have not yet been
brought before a magistrate for a probable cause hearing or otherwise. This Article is
concerned solely with arrestees but its reasoning would extend to pre-trial detainees as
well.
162. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 395.
165. Id. at 394-95.
166. 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (plurality).
167. Id. at 268 & n.1.
168. Id. at 268.
169. Id. at 269.
Fourteenth Amendment.1 70  Finding his claim to be barred under
Graham, the plurality wrote broadly: "Where a particular
Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection' against a particular sort of government behavior," Graham
excludes general due process from the equation.7 '
Graham might originally have been thought to apply only to the
criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights or, even more
specifically, only to the Fourth Amendment. '72  However, Albright
confirmed a broader reading of the rule. Following Albright,
commentary on Graham has almost uniformly read it broadly.'73
Moreover, Graham has been applied in other areas by the federal
courts of appeals, most notably in the Takings Clause context.
1 74
Thus, the Court has reached somewhat of a compromise between
Justice Black's "total and exclusive" incorporation and Justice
Murphy's "total and non-exclusive" incorporation, and created what
might be termed "total and modified exclusive" incorporation."'
General due process principles might be the basis for additional rights
but only in the interstices of the Bill of Rights, where no specific
provision clearly governs. Where, however, a governmental action
implicates a particular constitutional provision, only that provision
and "not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process'
170. Id. at 271.
171. Id. at 273 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)) (emphasis
added).
172. See, e.g., Robert Ashbrook, Comment, Land Development, the Graham Doctrine,
and the Extinction of Economic Substantive Due Process, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1267-68
(2002) (suggesting these possible limitations); Michael J. Phillips, The Nonprivacy
Applications of Substantive Due Process, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 537, 584-85 (1990) (reading
Graham more narrowly pre-Albright).
173. See Ashbrook, supra note 172, at 1267. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 19, at 1088-
89 ("Nothing in Graham suggests that the Court's preemptive approach to substantive due
process should apply only to Fourth Amendment cases. Rather, Graham Seems to apply
to all substantive due process inquiries."); accord Ashbrook, supra note 172, at 1289-92.
See also Jerold Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 399-404 (2001)
(acknowledging Graham's breadth but also noting that large portions of criminal
procedure are not affected by Graham).
174. See Ashbrook, supra note 172, at 1268-74 (discussing cases); Massaro, supra note
19, at 1088, 1099-1104 (same). In any event, even if the Graham rule applied only to "due
process" claims arguably covered by the Fourth Amendment, that narrow reading would
not affect this Article's central argument: that coerced confessions are more properly
viewed as Fourth Amendment events than as implicating due process.
175. But see Albright, 510 U.S. at 303 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the rule
stated by the plurality was "not unlike" Justice Black's "theory ... that the express
guarantees of the Bill of Rights mark the outer limit of Due Process protection").
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applies.'76 In this way, a rule of "field preemption""' applies to each
provision of the Bill of Rights: each covers the field it occupies-
whether it be "searches and seizures," "punishments," or some other
area where the State operates-to the exclusion of general notions of
fairness.
A concrete example will show how this might work in a real
criminal case.' Suppose that Barney, driving his car in a high drug-
prone neighborhood very late at night, is stopped by Police Officer
Lew for a broken taillight. As the officer is about to let Barney go
with a warning, Lew notices a bag of white powder in the passenger
seat. The officer has extensive training and experience in the sale and
packaging of narcotics and, based on that training and experience, as
well as the appearance of the powder and the character of the
neighborhood, believes it to be cocaine. Barney explains to the
officer that it is merely deodorizing powder for the car and urges him
to perform a field test on the substance. Barney happens to know
that such tests are routinely performed by police in other cities and
that they are reliable and take only minutes. However, they are
relatively expensive and this particular police force does not have the
budget for such a luxury item. In particular, Police Chief Wiggum is
on record as choosing more powerful weapons for his officers rather
than the field tests, because, according to the chief, most of those
accused of crime "are guilty anyway," and he did not "really care" if a
few innocent people have to spend a "few hours" in jail. So Barney is
arrested and, pursuant to a search incident to the arrest, a loaded
pistol is found in his waistband. Several days later, in preparation for
Grand Jury proceedings, the police perform a laboratory test on the
"drugs" and-lo and behold-there is no cocaine; Barney was telling
176. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. See also Albright, 510 U.S. at 276 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[T]his Court's jurisprudence ... rejects 'the more generalized notion of "substantive due
process"' at least to this extent: It cannot be used to impose additional requirements upon
such of the States' criminal processes as are already addressed (and left without such
requirements) by the Bill of Rights."); Massaro, supra note 19, at 1091 ("[S]pecific text
categorically trumps any vague substantive due process claim."). Compare Conn v.
Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 293 (1999) (claim regarding search of attorney's office while his
client was testifying in grand jury must be analyzed under Fourth Amendment) with
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-45 (1998) (claim regarding accidental
death caused by police during high-speed chase must be analyzed under Fourteenth
Amendment, since failed attempt to effect a seizure not covered by the Fourth).
177. See Massaro, supra note 19, at 1089 n.l, 1113.
178. The following scenario is based on the facts of Gonzalez v. City of New York, No.
94 Civ. 7377 (SHS), 1996 WL 227824, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1996). That decision was
rendered by Hon. Sidney H. Stein at the time that the author was clerking for him.
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the truth. Barney is indicted only for the gun possession.
Barney moves to suppress the gun under both the (incorporated)
Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. His Fourth Amendment claim goes something like this:
conceding that the officer had probable cause to arrest him, Barney
argues that, despite this, it was "unreasonable" for the police force
not to have available a quick and reliable field test. Had it done so,
the logic goes, the officer would have realized immediately that
Barney had no cocaine and would have let him go without ever
knowing about the gun. Because the gun was discovered only
because of the officer's allegedly "unreasonable" arrest, it should be
suppressed. His Due Process claim is similar but adds a subjective
intent element: the force's failure to make available a field test for its
officers, for reasons that are either malicious or, at best, deliberately
indifferent, resulted in his arrest-a deprivation of liberty without due
process-which in turn led to discovery of the gun.
Regardless of the success or failure of his (incorporated) Fourth
Amendment claim, '79 his pure due process claim should fail. Pursuant
to Graham, the circumstances of Barney's arrest are governed only by
the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, his
due process argument that the official decision of the police force not
to institute field testing was malicious or deliberately indifferent to
possibly innocent suspects will fall on deaf ears.
III. COERCED CONFESSIONS AND THE SELF-
INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
The considerations discussed in Part II present some difficulty in
grounding coerced-confession jurisprudence in the Due Process
Clause. After Graham v. Connor, one must ask whether the problem
presented by coerced confessions appears to be addressed by any
particular provision of the Bill of Rights that has been incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment. One immediately springs to
mind: the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. However,
placing sole reliance upon the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination to justify the prohibition against coerced confessions
presents problems of its own.
Upon one view, the coerced-confession cases were grounded in
the Self-Incrimination Clause all along. According to this view, the
179. Gonzalez indicates that the claim should fail because Officer Lew had probable
cause. Id. at *5-8.
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Court's reliance in Brown and its progeny on the Due Process Clause
alone was a pragmatic device, necessitated by prior decisions holding
that the Self-Incrimination Clause did not apply to the States via the
Fourteenth Amendment. This was the view expressed by the Court
itself in Malloy v. Hogan,' ° where the Court reversed course and held
the Self-Incrimination Clause to be incorporated against the States.'"
By its very terms, however, the Self-Incrimination Clause is
offended only when an accused's compelled statements are admitted
into evidence against him. The Clause provides that "[n]o person
shall.., be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. ... ,,182 The narrowest reading of this clause would prohibit
the prosecution only from forcing a person to actually testify at his
own trial.'83 Yet even a broad reading of the phrase "witness against
himself" requires that, before a constitutional violation is complete, a
speaker's words be used in a criminal judicial proceeding and "in
a.. .criminal case.". The Court has recently accepted this view in
Chavez v. Martinez.'5 There, as Martinez was being frisked by two
police officers, a scuffle ensued, during which Martinez was shot
several times, permanently blinding him and leaving him paralyzed
from the waist down. 6 As Martinez received emergency treatment at
a hospital, Chavez, a patrol sueprvisor, questioned him for ten
180. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 62-69. See also Grano, supra note 43, at 929
(stating that Malloy characterized coerced-confession cases as self-incrimination cases).
182. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
183. Clymer, supra note 28, at 459.
184. Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 869 n.36 ("[A] Fifth Amendment violation
occurs at the point when compelled testimony is introduced in a criminal case."): id. at
874-75 n.63 ("[U]nless the compelled statement is introduced at a criminal trial, a person
has not been made a 'witness' . . . against himself 'in' a 'criminal case."'); Clymer, supra
note 28, at 464-65 ("[U]se of a compelled statement in a criminal case is a necessary
precondition for a violation of the privilege."); Dix, supra note 28, at 261-62
(distinguishing between the collection of the confession and its use); Gardner, supra note
43, at 1288 ("A violation [of the Self-Incrimination Clause] does not occur until the
product of... compulsion is used against the suspect, i.e. until she becomes a witness
against herself.") (footnote omitted); Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the
Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from
Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907, 921 (1989) ("[U]nlike fourth
amendment rights, fifth amendment rights are not violated unless and until the statement
is used against the person making it... ").
185. 123 S.Ct. 1994, 200-04 (2003)(plurality); see also id. at 2006 (Souter, J., concurring
in the judgment)
186 Id. at 1999 (plurality).
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minutes over a 45-minute period.'87  Several times during the
interrogation, Martinez said that he was choking and dying, pleaded
for medical treatment, and stated that he would not tell Chavez
anything until he was treated, but Chavez persisted." Justice Stevens
described an audio recording of the interrogation as "vividly
demonstr[ing] that [Martinez] was suffering severe pain and mental
anguish.""'8  During the questioning, Martinez made at least two
incriminating statemens: that he had taken the gun from one of the
officers' holsters, and that he was a heroin user." However, as
Martinez was never prosecuted, these statements were never used
against him.' 9' He brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging a violation of his rights pursuant to both the Due Process
Clause (incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment) and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment standing alone.
A majority of the Court held that Martinez had no Self-
Incrimination claim because his confession was never used against
him. Relying on a close reading of the constitutional text, a plurality
of four Justices held that "Martinez was never made to be a 'witness'
against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause because his statements were never admitted as
testimony against him in a criminal case."'"" Justice Souter, in an
opinion joined by Justice Breyer, largely agreed with the plurality's
textual analysis that left Martinez's claim "well outside the core of
Fifth Amendment protection."'93
The result in Chavez is completely consistent with the use of the
word "witness" in another constitutional provision: the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause.'94 The Supreme Court has long
held that a criminal defendant's right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him" embraces as "witnesses against him" not only
those who actually testify at trial but also those who make out-of-
187 Id.
188 Id. at 2010-11 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189 Id. at 2011.
190 Id. at 1999 (plurality).
191 Id. at 2000 (plurality).
192 Id. at 2001 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.).
193 Id. at 2006 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
194. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ); accord Amar & Lettow,
supra note 92, at 900, 910 n.229, 919 & n.273.
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court statements later used at trial. 5 Indeed, even the narrowest
reading of the phrase "witness[] against him" with any current
viability would embrace persons who make out-of-court statements
"contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.' 9  Yet, regardless of
how broadly or narrowly this clause is read, it is undisputed that the
constitutional violation takes place, if at all, only at trial. Thus, it
would be absurd to think that a suspect's Confrontation Clause rights
have been implicated where the police, acting upon an anonymous tip
that a suspect committed a murder and ditched his gun in a park, dig
up the murder weapon, which they find is covered with the suspect's
fingerprints.'97  Rather, the Confrontation Clause would be
implicated, if at all, only if the anonymous tipster's statement is
introduced into evidence at trial. So, too, is the Self-Incrimination
Clause violated only when a defendant is "compelled... to be a
witness against himself," that is, in a criminal judicial proceeding.
Thus, while it would be accurate to say that the privilege is
implicated during custodial interrogation, it would be flatly wrong to
say-as the Supreme Court did in Miranda-that "the privilege is
fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation. ,19 8 The
195. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
196. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
197. This is true even if the suspect has already been formally accused of the crime, by
indictment or otherwise, such that there is an actual "criminal prosecution[]," triggering
the protections of the Sixth Amendment. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
Of course, if the police arrest the suspect before finding the gun, based solely on the tip,
his Fourth Amendment right not to be seized without sufficient cause is implicated. See
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270-72 (2000); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
Indeed, that police conduct in the investigatory and arrest phases of a criminal prosecution
is governed generally by the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth or Sixth, is exactly the
point of this Article.
198. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966). See also id. at 467 ("[T]he Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to
protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any
significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves."). This was simply the
result of imprecision on the part of the Court, for "Miranda does not hold that the police
station is somehow a courtroom." Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 910 n.229. See also
Loewy, supra note 184, at 919 ("[I]t is not accurate to say that the fifth amendment is
applicable to noncriminal proceedings as such."). Some judges and commentators do
indeed believe that the privilege can be violated once a confession is "compelled." See,
e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2016 (2003)(Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Thomas S. Schrock et al..
Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19-25
(1978). However, this view can be achieved only by ignoring the language of the Fifth
Amendment. See Clymer, supra note 28, at 489-502 (persuasively refuting this view).
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Court's fallacy stems from its failure to uncouple two distinct
concepts in the Self-Incrimination Clause: compulsion and witnessing.
While the compulsion anticipated by the Clause might well occur in
the station house, witnessing takes place only in a courtroom.'99 Thus,
while the Court was quite correct in its determination that the
"compelled" portion of the Clause can occur at any place and at any
time, the "witness against himself" portion can occur only in a judicial
proceeding. Thus, the Clause, and therefore the constitutional
privilege, is "fully applicable" only in a criminal judicial proceeding.
Of course, the stricture against using a person's own words
against him at trial partially explains the rule against coerced
confessions. Language in some of the early coerced-confession cases
makes this clear. Thus, in one instance, the Court drew an express
parallel between its (federal) Self-Incrimination cases and the
coerced-confession cases, condensing the two rules into one: "[A]
coerced or compelled confession cannot be used to convict a
defendant in any state or federal court."' ' Even where no express
parallel was made, the language in some cases made clear that the use
201of the confession at trial violated constitutional norms. Indeed, in
one extreme instance, the Court seemed to imply that the
Constitution was concerned only with the use of the confession at
trial when it wrote:
[P]etitioner does not, and cannot, ask redress in this proceeding
for any disregard of due process prior to his trial. The
gravamen of his complaint is the unfairness of the use of his
confessions, and what occurred in their procurement is relevant
199. Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 868 n. 28 ("[T]he Fifth Amendment protects
against compelling statements outside a 'criminal case' if those statements are later usable
inside a criminal case-at a criminal trial.") (emphasis in original); id. at 874-75 n.63
("[C]ompulsion may not exist within the criminal case; but the introduction of the
compelled statement-the witnessing-does occur in a criminal case, and it is this
introduction that violates the Fifth Amendment."). Amar and Lettow reach this
conclusion by reading the phrase "any criminal case" narrowly. However one interprets
"criminal case," the phrase "witness against himself" clearly contemplates a trial or other
formal judicial proceeding.
200. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 n.9 (1944). See Grano, supra note 43, at
929 n.358 (pointing out that this quote conflates the privilege against self-incrimination
and the rule against coerced confessions).
201. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 402 (1978) ("Due process of law
requires that statements obtained as these were cannot be used in any way against a
defendant at his trial."); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 504 (1963) (describing issue
as "whether the admission of the petitioner's written and signed confession into evidence
against him at trial constituted a denial of due process of law").
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only as it bears on that issue.2°2
Yet, there is something deeply unsettling to an intuitive sense of
justice when the constitutional violation vis-a-vis a coerced
confession-especially one extracted through physical violence-is
described as having occurred only when the confession is actually
used "against" the defendant at trial."' As the Court itself put it,
"important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the
government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a
confession out of an accused against his will. ''204 And as Professor
Paulsen once wrote: "There are some limits beyond which further
detention, questioning, and the imposition of indignities by order of
the police alone violate the orderly processes of a political system
which recognizes the dignity of man."2"5
Consider Brown.2°6 It is difficult to conceive of anyone familiar
with our history and traditions of constitutional governance
concluding that the State of Mississippi violated the defendants'
federal constitutional rights only when it admitted the defendants'
confessions into evidence at trial. To the contrary, the language of
the opinion points our attention to something more, something
deeper than simply a distaste for the use of a defendant's own
compelled words against him. After all the comparison to a
"'medieval account ' ' 21 surely refers to the torture itself, not merely
the use of its products to convict the defendants. Moreover, the
opinion speaks of the "methods ... taken to procure the confessions"
(not simply the use of those confessions) as "revolting to the sense of
justice."2" In short, as the opinion itself states, "[c]ompulsion by
202. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 235 (1941) (emphasis added).
203. See Donald A. Dripps, Supreme Court Review: Foreward: Against Police
Interrogation-And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 699, 712-13 (1988) (arguing that the Self-Incrimination Clause is neither
necessary nor sufficient to prevent torture, brutality, and cruelty toward arrestees); Grano,
supra note 43, at 924 (noting that if police use torture to obtain confession but confession
is never used at trial, conviction cannot be attacked); Ritchie, supra note 28, at 393 (noting
that the act of torture would not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause so long as any
resulting statement is not used against the suspect).
204. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960).
205. Paulsen, supra note 110, at 437; see also R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral
and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 41 (1981) (writing that coercive
interrogation tactics conflict "with respect for autonomy and dignity").
206. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See supra text accompanying notes 27-
34.
207. Brown, 297 U.S. at 283, 282 (quoting State v. Brown, 161 So. 465, 470 (1935)
(Griffith, J., dissenting), rev'd, 297 U.S. 278).
208. Id. at 286.
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torture to extort a confession is a different matter."2°9
Accordingly, the Court and its individual Justices have often
expressed the intuitive sense that compelling a confession by torture
or other coercive means is a delict of a constitutional magnitude in
and of itself, regardless of whether the product is ever used against
the confessor.21° Thus, the methods used to extract a confession, and
not merely the later use of the confession at trial, are often described
as violating due process. Of course, the use of the confession at trial
is an independent constitutional violation, but it is also an
exacerbation of the initial error, in much the same way as is the use of
the products of an unlawful search or seizure. The Court's coerced-
confession jurisprudence is thus not aimed solely-or even
primarily-at protecting defendants from compelled self-
incrimination. It is aimed at deterring "illicit methods" by the police,
by denying the prosecution the "fruits" of those methods.211 It was, of
course, that very goal that animated the adoption of the exclusionary
rule in both federal and state Fourth Amendment cases.212
Moreover, if the primary concern were the use of the confession
at trial, one might think that reliability enhancement would be the
primary focus of coerced-confessions jurisprudence. Yet reliability
has steadily been de-emphasized.213  Under the common law of
209. Id. at 285. It has been argued that the officers in Brown administered "cruel and
unusual punishment" as well, in violation of the (incorporated) Eighth Amendment.
Loewy, supra note 184, at 935. However, the Supreme Court has made clear that Eighth
Amendment protections are not triggered until after conviction. See Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989).
210. See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (characterizing the rule
against the admission of coerced confessions as one of "the exclusionary rules.., aimed at
deterring lawless conduct by the police"); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962)
("[T]he formal confession on which this conviction may have rested was obtained in
violation of due process.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 320 (1959) ("[T]he police must obey the law while enforcing the law .. ");
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949) (plurality) ("[T]he Due Process Clause bars police
procedure which violates the basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime
and vitiates a conviction based on the fruits of such procedure .... ) (emphasis added).
See also Clymer, supra note 28, at 477 n.124 ("[T]here is considerable support for the
proposition that the taking of a coerced confessions alone can violate due process .... ");
Herman, supra note 37, at 451, 454, 457 (arguing that the rule against coerced confession
"was developed with an emphasis on opprobrious police conduct"); Paulsen, supra note
110, at 419 ("With Ashcraft and Malinski the disciplining of state law enforcement officers
became a principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment confessions rule.").
211. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 302, 307 (Frankfurter, J., joining in reversal of judgment).
212. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960).
213. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 76, at 452-58.
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evidence, coerced confessions were excludable because they were
deemed unreliable.214 In the eyes of some, after the Supreme Court
constitutionalized the area of coerced confessions, the reliability
justification was constitutionalized along with it.2"5 While "a complex
of values underlies the stricture against use by the state of [coerced]
confessions, '21 6 the Justices argued amongst themselves whether
reliability-enhancement was the primary goal. Thus, the Court wrote:
"[R]eliance on a coerced confession vitiates a conviction because such
a confession combines the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness
with what judicial experience shows to be illusory and deceptive
evidence. A forced confession is a false foundation for any
conviction... .,27 On the other hand, the Court had also written:
"The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude
presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness
in the use of evidence, whether true or false." '218
However, the focus eventually shifted from the reliability-
enhancing justification, and the "police methods" rationale behind
the Court's coerced confession jurisprudence came to the fore. Thus,
the Court wrote in Spano v. New York:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions
does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also
turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the
law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict
those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals
themselves." '
214. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000). See also JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 822 (3d ed. 1940)).
215. Dix, supra note 28, at 263 (arguing that reliability-enhancement was the original
justification of coerced-confession jurisprudence); Paulsen, supra note 110, at 414-17
(arguing that reliability-enhancement was the primary focus of the jurisprudence for its
first eight years); accord Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("[T]here was an initial emphasis on reliability .... ).
216. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,207 (1960).
217. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953), overruled by Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964). Justice Jackson, who authored Stein, appears to have been the main
proponent of reliability-enhancement as the primary justification for the Court's coerced
confession jurisprudence. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring in the result) ("no confession that has been obtained by any form of physical
violence to the person is reliable...").
218. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
219. 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959). See also Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206 ("[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment forbids 'fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether
true or false."') (quoting Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 236); id. at 207 ("[N]either the likelihood
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And two Terms later, the Court laid to rest once and for all the
notion that reliability-enhancement was the primary justification for
the constitutional proscription against coerced confessions. In Rogers
v. Richmond, it wrote that this rule did not exist
because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because
the methods used to extract them offend an underlying
principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is
an accusatorial ... system-a system in which the State must
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured
and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused
out of his own mouth .... To be sure, confessions cruelly
extorted may be and have been, to an unascertained extent,
found to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of
excluding confessions that are not voluntary does not rest on
this consideration.
Thus, it is commonly accepted that the modern jurisprudence on
coerced confessions is concerned with reliability-enhancement as only
an ancillary matter. 1 While that rationale still remains as an
important aspect of coerced-confession jurisprudence, it cannot
provide a full account.
Accordingly, the Court has continued to intimate that it is the
methods of interrogation themselves, and not just the use of the
product at trial, that offends due process. Thus, the Court wrote in
Miller v. Fenton: "This Court has long held that certain interrogation
techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique
that the confession is untrue nor the preservation of the individual's freedom of will is the
sole interest at stake."). Writing five years before Spano, Professor Paulsen pinpointed
the Court's decisions in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), and Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), as the turning point from the focus on reliability of the
confession to the focus on police methods. See Paulsen, supra note 110, at 417-19.
220. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (emphasis added). See
KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 76, at 454 (calling Rogers the Court's "most emphatic
statement of the point that untrustworthiness of a confession was not (or no longer) the
principal reason for excluding it...").
221. See KAMISAR ET AL, supra note 76,. at 453 ("Untrustworthiness is no longer the
sole, or even the principal, reason for excluding coerced or involuntary confessions.");
Grano, supra note 43, at 919 (arguing that trustworthiness of evidence is an underlying
concern of coerced-confessions jurisprudence, though not the primary one); see Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced
Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 169-70 (1991) (arguing that reliability is of secondary
importance to more deeply-rooted notions of justice embodied by rule against coerced
confessions). Dix, supra note 28, at 272-73, suggests that Connelly abandoned altogether
the reliability-enhancement as a justification for the rule against coerced confessions.
However, the Court has subsequently invoked this justification as an ancillary concern.
See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692-93 (1993).
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characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized
system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment., 2 2 In this way, the Court
continues to acknowledge the dual focus of its coerced-confession
jurisprudence, on proscribing both the use of compelled statements at
trial and on the methods used to extract them. In perhaps its most
self-reflective occasion on the subject, the Court referred to this dual
purpose in justifying the placement of its coerced confession
jurisprudence in the Due Process Clause:
It is telling that in confession cases coming from the States, this
Court has consistently looked to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to test admissibility. The locus of the right is
significant because it reflects the Court's consistently held view that
the admissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the
techniques for extracting the statements, as applied to this suspect,
are compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures
that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means as on
whether the defendant's will was in fact overborne.223
The Court has also continued to treat the exclusion of coerced
confessions in the same "exclusionary rule" terms it uses to address
the exclusion of the products of Fourth Amendment violations. Thus,
in Colorado v. Connelly, the Court wrote of the "involuntary"
confession at issue in that case: "The purpose of excluding evidence
seized in violation of the Constitution is to substantially deter future
violations of the Constitution.,
224
Accordingly, the Court has historically viewed, and continues to
view, the constitutional problem implicated by the coerced confession
not to be solely, or even primarily, its introduction into evidence at
trial. Rather, the use at trial of the coerced confession is seen
primarily as only an ancillary problem, secondary to the original
constitutional violation: the extraction of the confession in the first
place. The Self-Incrimination Clause, with its focus on the use of
evidence at trial, is thus an improper locus for the constitutional
stricture against coerced confessions.
222. 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
224. 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986).
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IV. THE COERCED CONFESSION AS THE PRODUCT
OF AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The foregoing presents somewhat of a dilemma. The
proscription against coerced confessions is firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence-and, most would think, rightfully so. After all, the
kind of physical torture described in Brown and the extraordinary
psychological coercion involved in much of Brown's progeny should
have no place in any civilized system of criminal justice. Yet, the
Court has required, if at all possible, that any constitutional claim be
stated in terms specific to a particular provision of the Bill of Rights.
If a claimed constitutional deprivation touches on an area explicitly
covered by one of the first eight amendments, the claim will succeed
only if one of those provisions itself was violated, without a reliance
on any background notion of general "due process." And, while the
use of a coerced confession at trial obviously implicates the Self-
Incrimination Clause, that Clause is not broad enough to address
what is at the heart of the constitutional violation: the coercive tactics
used to extract the confession.
One must ask, then, whether coercion by government officials
that produces a confession implicates any other specific clauses of the
Bill of Rights. The answer is the Fourth Amendment, the repository
of rights that "the people" maintain against the government, State or
federal, when it is in the investigatory and arrest stages of a criminal
proceeding. The Fourth Amendment prohibits both searches and
seizures that, for a variety of reasons, are considered unreasonable,
and also excludes from criminal trials evidence that is a proximate
result of such unreasonable searches and seizures. This jurisprudence
can be applied to the phenomenon of the coerced confession, which is
the product of both an unreasonable continuing seizure of the suspect
and an unreasonable search of his mind for evidence.
A. The Products of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Before seeing how conventional Fourth Amendment principles
might be extended to cover coerced confessions, it will be helpful to
look to traditional Fourth Amendment case law on both
unreasonable seizures and unreasonable searches that offers the most
compelling analogues.
1. Unreasonable Seizures: Strictures on When, Where, How, and For
How Long a Person May be Seized
The Supreme Court has long interpreted the Fourth Amendment
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to place limits on several dimensions of "seizures" of individuals by
State officials. Violation of these limitations will result in exclusion of
any evidence that proximately results from the violation. Thus, the
Court has placed limitations on when a person may be seized: The
police may arrest a suspect only after they have obtained evidence
establishing probable cause that he has committed, is committing, or
is about to commit a crime,225 and they may stop and detain a person
only if they have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or the
potential therefor.226 Likewise, the Supreme Court has placed some
limits on where a person may be seized: It has held that the police
generally may not arrest a person in his home without a warrant, even
if they do have probable cause."' Any seizure effected in violation of
these rules is "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. If the
police undertake an "unreasonable seizure," any resulting evidence-
whether consisting of physical evidence,229  statements of the
arrestee, or an identification of him by a third person..--is
suppressed as the "tainted fruit of the poisonous tree," so long as
there is a sufficient nexus between the evidence and the underlying
illegality.231
Most relevant for purposes of a discussion of the applicability of
Fourth Amendment principles to coerced confessions are two discrete
areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the reasonableness of
arrests: how arrests may be effected and for how long detention may
continue before judicial oversight occurs.
a. Excessive Force: How an Arrest Can be Effected.
The main Fourth Amendment constraint on how the police may
take someone into custody has already been discussed to some extent:
the police may not use excessive force in effecting a seizure. Indeed,
225. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-16 (1979).
226. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
227. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Some other specialized rules also apply
to how State officials may effect an arrest in the home. For example, the police must
generally announce their presence before entering with force, Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927, 934 (1995), and the police may not bring third parties along, other than to aid in
executing the arrest warrant. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999).
228. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212-16.
229. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690-93 (1982).
230. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472-73 (1980).
231. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1991). The State may defeat this
exclusionary rule by showing that the taint was attenuated. Taylor, 457 U.S. at 690-93.
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the specific (and non-controversial) holding of Graham v. Connor 32
was that the use of physical force during an arrest is measured by a
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. The Court had
established this rule four years earlier in Garner v. Tennessee,233 where
it had first held that the Fourth Amendment governs how a seizure is
carried out. There, the survivor of a burglary suspect, shot dead by a
police officer when the suspect attempted to flee, brought suit
claiming that such a "seizure" was unreasonable under the
circumstances. 2' The various defendants claimed that once the police
have probable cause to arrest, "the Fourth Amendment has nothing
to say about how that seizure is made., 235 The Court quickly rejected
this argument, holding that "it is plain that reasonableness depends
on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried out. 236
Indeed, the point was so non-controversial that the three dissenters
accepted it without question.237 Thus, it is well-settled that how a
seizure is carried out is governed by a Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard.
b. The Gerstein/McLaughlin Rule: How Long a Person May be
Detained.
The Court has also held that a person arrested by the State
without a warrant has a presumptive Fourth Amendment right to a
judicial determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours of
arrest. If no such determination is made, the arrestee must be
released from custody.238 In Gerstein v. Pugh,239 the Court held that
while the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrantless arrest be
premised on a probable cause determination by the arresting officer,
the Amendment's protections do not end there. Rather, "the Fourth
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a
232. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). See supra text accompanying notes
158-65.
233. 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985).
234. See id. at 3-5.
235. Id. at 7.
236. Id. at 8.
237. See id. at 25-26 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
238. This mirrors the rule once applied in federal cases, but not as a constitutional
matter, suppressing any statement taken during a period of "unnecessary delay" before
the suspect was brought before a magistrate. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449,
454-56 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344-46 (1943).
239. 420 U.S. 103,113-15 (1975).
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prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.""24 The
Court noted that Fourth Amendment protection even in the period
"following arrest" was essential because "[tlhe consequences of
prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference
occasioned by arrest."24 ' The Court even cited "indications" that a
prompt appearance before a judicial officer was regarded by the
Framers as one of the dimensions of a "reasonable" seizure.
212
In an important sense, Gerstein prefigured Graham. Justice
Stewart, agreeing with the State detainees in Gerstein, argued in a
concurrence that an initial appearance before a judicial officer
sometimes would require some of the incidents of an adversary
proceeding as an aspect of "due process., 24 Specifically, he reasoned
that general due process principles applied, and that reliance solely
on the Fourth Amendment was insufficient, because the case did "not
involve an initial arrest, but rather the continuing incarceration of a
presumptively innocent person. ' 2"  In a crucial passage, the Court
rejected that argument: "The Fourth Amendment was tailored
explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between
individual and public interests always has been thought to define the
240. Id. at 114 (emphasis added). In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,
56 (1991), the Court held that if such determination is not made within forty-eight hours
after arrest, the continued detention of the suspect is presumptively unreasonable. The
Court has not yet determined whether and under what circumstances a confession that is
taken during a period of detention unlawful under Gerstein and McLaughlin must be
suppressed. Compare Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 85 & n.* (1994) (declining to decide
issue) with id. at 89-92 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (opining that, under circumstances of the
case, suspect's confession could not have been product of GersteinlMcLaughlin violation).
See George C. Thomas III, The Poisoned Fruit of Pretrial Detention, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
413, 460 (1986) (arguing that a confession made during any period of detention that
constituted a Gerstein violation should be suppressed).
The Court has sometimes, in determining whether a confession was coerced, taken into
account whether the police failed to take a suspect before a magistrate in a timely fashion
after arrest. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. It expressly rejected the notion
that such a delay per se rendered excludable any confession taken during that time period.
See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 186-88 (1953), overruled by Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964). Justice Douglas was a strong proponent of such a per se rule. See, e.g.,
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 448 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("I would hold that any
confession obtained by the police while the defendant is under detention is inadmissible,
unless there is prompt arraignment and unless the accused is informed of his right to
silence and accorded an opportunity to consult counsel."); Loewy, supra note 184, at 935
(opining that lengthy delay between booking and confession in Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963), "constituted an unreasonable seizure under the [F]ourth [A]mendment").
241. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
242. Id. at 115.
243. Id. at 127 (Stewart, J., concurring in part).
244. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring in part).
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'process that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal
cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial." '245 This was
the germ from which Graham later sprang.246
2. Unreasonable Searches: Strictures on Gathering Evidence from
Within the "Person" of the Suspect
Much of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on what constitutes
an "unreasonable search" revolves around either the meaning of the
word "search," '247 what level of suspicion is required under the
circumstances,"' or whether the ordinary warrant requirement may be
dispensed with.249 However, three cases stand out as guideposts for
reasonableness of the intimate and intrusive "search" of a "person"
where probable cause is established and the warrant requirement is
either met or inapplicable. The guidelines they establish form a
strong analogue to the Court's coerced-confession jurisprudence.
250
a. Rochin v. California.
In the course of his arrest, Rochin had swallowed two capsules
believed to contain narcotics.25 ' He was taken to a hospital where, at
the direction of an officer, an emetic solution was forced into
245. Id. at 125 n.27.
246. Accord Israel, supra note 159, at 404. Curiously, the Graham Court did not cite
Gerstein, although the plurality in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994) (plurality),
did. ("We have in the past noted the Fourth Amendment's relevance to the deprivations
of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions.") (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at
114).
247. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) ("This case presents the
question whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a
public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.")
248. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (reasonable suspicion, not probable
cause, needed for frisk). These include the so-called "special needs" cases. See, e.g., Bd.
of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (no individualized suspicion necessary to perform
drug tests on students participating in extracurricular activities).
249. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969) (deciding "whether the
warrantless search of the petitioner's entire house can be constitutionally justified as
incident to [his] arrest").
250. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). While Rochin technically is a due process case, not a Fourth
Amendment case, the Court recently noted that if Rochin were decided today, it "would
be treated under the Fourth Amendment, [and] with the same result." County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998). The decision to treat Rochin as a
Fourth Amendment case is defended infra at text accompanying notes 289-91.
251. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
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Rochin's stomach against his will, causing him to vomit.5 2 The two
capsules were recovered and found to contain morphine and, based
largely on that evidence, he was convicted of illegally possessing the
drug.253 Inventing a now-familiar standard, the Court held that the
judgment against Rochin had been obtained in violation of his due
process rights because the officers' "conduct ... shock[ed] the
conscience., 254  The Court analogized the case to its coerced-
confession jurisprudence and, referring directly to Brown v.
Mississippi,215 wrote: "It would be a stultification of the responsibility
which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to
hold that in order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force
what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach.,
256
257b. Schmerber v. California.
After being involved in an auto accident, Schmerber was taken
to a hospital where a police officer directed a doctor to take a blood
sample from Schmerber against his will.28 A chemical analysis of the
blood revealed he was intoxicated at the time. The analysis was
admitted into evidence at Schmerber's State trial for driving under
the influence and he was convicted.2 6°  In addressing his Fourth
Amendment claim,26' the Court first noted that the procedure
performed on Schmerber was undoubtedly a "search" of his
"person," an event cognizable under the Fourth Amendment, and
that, accordingly, the question was whether that search was
"reasonable. 2 62 The Court also noted that its prior "search" cases
had "little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions
beyond the body's surface., 26 This case was different; the Court was
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 172.
255. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
256. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173.
257. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
258. Id. at 758.
259. Id. at 759.
260. Id. at 758-59.
261. Schmerber also raised a number of other claims, none of which was successful.
See id. at 759-60 (pure due process claim); id. at 760-65 (self-incrimination claim); id. at
765-66 (right to counsel claim).
262. Id. at 767-68.
263. Id. at 769.
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"writ[ing] on a clean slate"2'" because of the heightened solicitude
society gives to "[t]he integrity of an individual's person." '265
Ultimately, the Court upheld the search as reasonable after
examining several of its characteristics. First, the Court found the
procedure itself to have been so "commonplace" as to be almost a
"ritual."2" Second, the Court found that blood tests, in common
experience, are minimally intrusive, as they involve the extraction of
small amounts of blood and cause "virtually no risk, trauma, or
pain. ,267 The Court also relied on the fact that the blood test was
"highly effective" in determining whether and to what extent a person
is intoxicated.29 Finally, the test in this case was conducted





c. Winston v. Lee.270
Lee was charged with attempted robbery based on an incident in
which a shopkeeper, ordered to freeze by an armed assailant, instead
fired at him, appearing to hit the assailant in the left side of the
chest.27 ' After returning fire and wounding the shopkeeper, the
assailant fled.22  Lee was found, with a chest wound, eight blocks
away by police and he told them he had been shot by two individuals
attempting to rob him.273 The officers, apparently still ignorant of the
attempted robbery of the shopkeeper, took him to the same hospital
to which the shopkeeper had been taken earlier.274 When the
shopkeeper saw Lee, he identified Lee as the man who shot him, and
charges were filed against Lee.275 Thereafter, the prosecution moved
for an order in state court to have Lee undergo surgery to remove the
bullet from his left chest area, in order to show that the bullet came
264. Id. at 767-68.
265. Id. at 772.
266. Id. at 771 & n.13.
267. Id. at 771.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
271. Id. at 755.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 756.
274. Id. at 755-56.
275. Id. at 756.
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from the shopkeeper's gun.276 Ultimately, it was determined that the
bullet was lodged about one inch deep in the muscle tissue in Lee's
chest and that it would be necessary to put Lee under general
anesthesia to remove it.277
The Supreme Court held that, under these circumstances, it
would be unreasonable to force Lee to undergo the surgery against
his will, notwithstanding the obvious existence of probable cause to
believe that the search would bear valuable evidence, and regardless
of whether a warrant was required. The Court noted that, in general,
"where the community's need for evidence surmounts a specified
standard, ordinarily 'probable cause,"' it is reasonable for the State to
conduct a search, "[p]utting to one side the procedural protections of
the warrant requirement.""27 Yet, relying on Schmerber, the Court
held that "[a] compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body
for evidence" is different from other types of searches, because it
"implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude
that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to produce
evidence of a crime." '279 Intrusions into the "person," the Court wrote,
implicate our "most personal and deep-rooted expectations of
privacy. ' m  Thus, a search warrant based on probable cause,
ordinarily sufficient to validate a search, are only "threshold
requirements" in this context.281' The Court then identified the factors
it had utilized in Schmerber to determine whether such a search was
reasonable: "the extent to which the procedure may threaten the
safety or health of the individual" ;28 "the extent of intrusion upon the
individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily
integrity" ;283 and the State's need to conduct the search.
2
8
The Court relied heavily upon the second and third of these
factors to disallow the search. With regard to the first factor, the
Court acknowledged that the risks of the procedure were probably
"not extremely severe" but were in "considerable dispute."'2 5
276. 470 U.S. 756.
277. Id. at 757.
278. Id. at 759.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 760.
281. Id. at 760-61.
282. 470 U.S. at 761.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 765.
285. Id. at 766. See also id. at 763-64 (describing the lack of clarity of the record on this
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However, it was not disputed that the intrusion into Lee's privacy and
dignitary interests "can only be characterized as severe";286 as the
Court bluntly and graphically put it, "the Commonwealth proposes to
take control of [Lee's] body, to 'drug this citizen-not yet convicted
of a criminal offense-with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of
unconsciousness,' and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of
a crime. ,287 On the other hand, the State had failed to demonstrate a
"compelling need" for the bullet, largely because of the identification
of Lee by the injured shopkeeper and the circumstantial evidence in
the case.286 On balance, then, the surgical procedure would have
constituted an unreasonable search.
B. Coerced Confessions and Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Using the appropriate analogues from well-established Fourth
Amendment case law, one can see how the extracting by State
officials of a coerced confession implicates the Fourth Amendment in
at least two respects. It is at once the product of an unreasonable
seizure of an individual and of an unreasonable search of his mind for
evidence. 9
1. The Coerced Confession as the Product of an Unreasonable Seizure
Conventional wisdom has it that the Fourth Amendment is
implicated with respect to a suspect's statement only to the extent
point).
286. Id. at 766.
287. Id. at 765 (quoting Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 901 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470
U.S. 753 (1985)).
288. 470 U.S. at 765-66. This is perhaps the least satisfying portion of the Court's
opinion. Rare is the prosecutor who would take solace in a one-witness identification,
along with purely circumstantial evidence, when she could have a ballistics expert testify
that the bullet in Lee's chest almost certainly came from the shopkeeper's gun. Moreover,
the Court utilized purely circular logic when it reasoned: "The very circumstances relied
on in this case to demonstrate probable cause to believe that evidence will be found tend
to vitiate the Commonwealth's need to compel [Lee] to undergo surgery." Id. at 765. But
if probable cause is a threshold requirement in every case of this type, then the very facts
establishing probable cause will always "vitiate" the State's purported need for the
evidence.
289. This suggestion has previously been made in Akhil Reed Amar & Ren6e B.
Lettow, Self-Incrimination and the Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder to Professor Kamisar,
93 MICH. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1995) ("Abusive actions in police stations, squad cars, and
crime scenes.., are paradigmatic unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment.") (emphasis omitted). See also Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 927
("[T]he root antitorture idea is largely a Fourth Amendment idea and not a Fifth
Amendment idea."). However intuitively on-target these observations are, Amar and
Lettow do not cite anything in support.
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that "if custody itself was illegally obtained, the court will inquire
whether the suspect's statement was its unattenuated product., 2 ° Yet
why should the Fourth Amendment stop there? While an arrest
without probable cause is an unreasonable seizure, it is undisputed
that the use of excessive force in effecting the arrest renders the
seizure unreasonable as well.29 ' Moreover, this is true regardless of
whether the police are motivated by a desire to extract a confession,
to administer "street justice," or simply to satisfy some sadistic
predilection.292 If, during an arrest occasioned by excessive physical
force, the suspect blurts out, "Okay, I did it, stop beating me!" such a
confession surely is the "unattenuated product" of the unreasonable
seizure and should be suppressed.
From that hypothetical case, it is only a short step to Brown.
There, excessive force (to put it lightly) was used, not during the
arrest, but in its immediate aftermath, while the suspects were being
held in custody. But, again, there seems no sense in artificially
truncating Fourth Amendment protections at the point that the arrest
itself has been successfully effected. Rather, "[t]he Fourth
Amendment's instruction to police officers seems.., more purposive
and embracing., 293 Thus, Justice Ginsburg, relying in equal measure
on "common law" and "common sense and common understanding,"
concluded in her concurrence in Albright v. Oliver94 that a Fourth
Amendment seizure continues even after a suspect posts bond and
leaves actual custody. A fortiori, according to this reasoning, a
seizure continues at least while a person is in custody.9
Although the circuit courts are split on this issue,2 96 it appears
290. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence From the Mind of the Criminal Suspect, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1137, 1153 (1987).
291. See supra Part IV.A.I.a. See also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 279 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment governed both the manner of, and
the cause for, arresting Albright.").
292. See supra text accompanying notes 158-65.
293. Albright, 510 U.S. at 277 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
294. Id. at 277-79 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
295. See Irene M. Baker, Comment, Wilson v. Spain: Will Pretrial Detainees Escape
from the Constitutional "Twilight Zone?", 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 449, 478-80 (2001)
(arguing that all arrestees and pretrial detainees are covered by Fourth Amendment);
Mitchell W. Karsch, Note, Excessive Force and the Fourth Amendment: When Does
Seizure End?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 836-40 (1990) (arguing that arrestees are
covered by Fourth Amendment until their first appearance before a judicial officer).
296. Compare Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 2002) (adopting continuing
seizure approach); Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 879-80 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Wilson
v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d
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that the Court already treats as a continuing Fourth Amendment
seizure the time between actual arrest of a suspect and (at least) his
first appearance before a magistrate, the time period with which we
are primarily concerned. First, there is Albright.297  While Justice
Ginsburg was the only Justice to address this issue explicitly in
Albright,"' it appears that a majority of the Court agreed with her
analysis. After all, if Albright had not been seized, his due process
claim would not have been deemed, by both the plurality and Justice
Souter, to have been "pre-empted" by the standards of the Fourth
Amendment.99
Moreover, in Gerstein3" and its progeny, as well as in other cases,
200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Frohmader v. Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1026 (10th Cir.
1992) (same); Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (same), with Riley v.
Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the "continuing seizure" concept);
Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); Reed v. City of Chicago,
77 F.3d 1049, 1052 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 456
(5th Cir. 1994) (same).
297. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
298. See Eric J. Wunsch, Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment-Malicious
Prosecution and § 1983: Is There a Constitutional Violation Remediable Under Section
1983?, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 878, 904-05 (1995).
299. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 274 (plurality) ("The Framers considered the matter of
pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.")
(emphasis added); id. at 289 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing the
"Fourth Amendment seizure that followed when [Albright] surrendered himself into
police custody"). See also John T. Ryan, Jr., Note, Malicious Prosecution Claims Under
Section 1983: Do Citizens Have Federal Recourse? 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 776, 798
(1996) (majority in Albright assumed plaintiff was seized the entire time); id. at 803
(contending that the majority held that "claims of injury for unreasonable searches or
seizures that occur following arrest are more properly analyzed under a Fourth
Amendment analysis") (emphasis added). Cf. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 842-45 (1998) (because failed attempt to effect arrest was not a "seizure," a claim
regarding accidental death caused by police during high-speed chase must be analyzed
under Fourteenth Amendment). Justice Souter, joined by justice breyer, recently hinted
that interrogation can be part of a Fourth Amendment "seizure." In Chavez v. Martinez,
123 S.Ct. 1994, 2007-08 (2003)(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment), Justice Souter
wrote that "any argument for a damages remedy.. .must depend.. .upon the particular
charge of outrageous conduct by the police, extending from their initial encounter with
Martinez through the questioning ny Chavez." (emphasis added). However, he went on to
write, incorrectly in my opinion, that any such claim "must sound in substantive due
process." Id. at 2008 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). If the 'initial encounter"
between the police and Martinez is examined as a Fourth Amendment event, as it must be
pursuant to Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989), and if the same constitutional
standard governs the entire "extend[ed]" incident, as Justice Souter suggested, then the
Fourth Amendment governs Chavez's interrogation of Martinez as well. Pursuant to that
standard, the police conduct need not be "outrageous" in order to afford Martinez a
damages remedy; it need only be "unreasonable."
300. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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the Court seems to have decided that a Fourth Amendment seizure
can continue for hours or even days. Thus, the Court has set
"reasonableness" limits on how long a person may be detained on
reasonable suspicion' or on probable cause without a warrant or the
initiation of other judicial proceedings.' ° In these cases, the requisite
level of suspicion undoubtedly allows officials to take a suspect into
custody. The further Fourth Amendment issue is how long they can
keep the suspect in custody, absent review by an impartial magistrate.
Thus, the implicit understanding undergirding these cases is that a
continuing detention is a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment
purposes. 3 Indeed, Justice Stewart's contention in Gerstein that the
Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to "continuing incarceration"
was specifically rejected by the Court, which wrote that the ambit of
the Fourth Amendment "includ[es] the detention of suspects pending
trial. 
,,301
Thus, the result in Brown is dictated, not by vague notions of due
process, but by the combined results of Garner, Graham, and
Gerstein. Where excessive force is used during the time period
following arrest but before judicial proceedings are instituted, a
Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure has occurred. If a
confession results, it is the product of the illegality.
Finally, if the Fourth Amendment does apply at least during that
interval between arrest and the initiation of formal judicial
proceedings, then its reasonableness standard governs all aspects of
the continuing seizure. Under Graham, this reasonableness standard
displaces the formerly utilized standard of due process, such that all
of the psychological pressures and tactics once measured by a due
301. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540-44 (1985) (holding
sixteen-hour detention before warrant obtained not an unreasonable seizure under
circumstances).
302. See Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 83 (1994); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114. See generally supra Part IV.A.1.b. See
also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 807
(1994) (arguing that a person required to appear before a grand jury for weeks on end has
been "seized").
303. See Thomas, supra note 232, at 459-60 (arguing that in unlawful pretrial detention
cases, the constitutional "violation is the detention itself," and is a "continuing fourth
amendment violation," and concluding that Fourth Amendment protection extends
beyond actual arrest).
304. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27; see supra text accompanying notes 235-38. Any
contrary rule would work perverse results; state officials would simply avoid any Fourth
Amendment consequences regarding the length of a detention simply by virtue of the fact
that, at some point, the "seizure" is over and Fourth Amendment protections thereby
dissipate.
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process standard ought now to be subject to a test of reasonableness.
If the use of physical force during that period is governed by a
reasonableness standard, then so should the threat of physical force.
If overt physical violence is measured by reasonableness, then so, too,
should the subtler but no less physically violent tactics of sleep- and
food-deprivation. If the battering of a person's body is subject to a
test of reasonableness, then so should the battering of his mind and
soul that comes from prolonged and persistent questioning, isolation
in foreign surroundings from friends and loved ones, the use of tricks
and deception, exploitation of his impaired mental state by drug or
disease, the use of threats of legal process against family members,
and humiliating treatments. In short, all of the reasons the Court
gave to extend Brown's due process analysis to cover all manner of
psychologically coercive tactics apply with equal force to support the
extension in that context, in the wake of Graham, of a reasonableness
inquiry.
2. The Coerced Confession as the Product of an Unreasonable Search
At the same time, Rochin, Schmerber, and Winston collectively
provide a useful analogue to the "unreasonable search" aspect of
coerced-confession jurisprudence. As the Court explained in
Schmerber and Winston, certain searches are so intrusive-they are
"hyper-intrusive" 3 5-that a substantial justification is required before
they can be deemed reasonable, even if the probable cause and
warrant requirements have been met. Specifically, these cases, and
Rochin before them, held "intrusions beyond the body's surface ' '31 to
a heightened reasonableness requirement.
There seems little reason to limit the scope of such "intrusions
beyond the body's surface" to the sifting of stomach contents, blood,
muscle, and sinew, to the exclusion of the contents of a person's mind.
The "operative principle" in either instance "concerns control of the
curtilage of the self," or the "freedom from intimate inspection.,
307
After all, the Fourth Amendment secures "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, 3 8 and "[t]he mind [is] part of the person
305. See Ric Simmons, Can Winston Save Us from Big Brother?: The Need for Judicial
Consistency in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, RUTGERS L. J. (forthcoming 2003).
"Bodily Intrusion" searches, including those in Rochin, Schmerber, and Winston, make up
a discrete sub-category of "hyper-intrusive searches" in Simmons' taxonomy. See id.
306. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769 (1966).
307. Uviller, supra note 282, at 1146.
308. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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protected by this precept."3'0 As Professor Uviller wrote:
"Particularly where the mind of the party is the repository, the
inquisitorial method of dislodging the evidence offends deeply
ingrained notions of individual immunity from hostile state
incursion., 310 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment's list of the areas it
protects-"persons, houses, papers, and effects"-appears
purposefully to read in descending order of importance, whereby
"persons" are placed at the very core of protection, with the other
concepts extending out in concentric circles.31' And if "persons" are
at the core of Fourth Amendment protection, it seems fitting that the
mind of the "person" is at the very "bullseye."'3 2 Thus, "[i]nvasion by
the government to perceive the operation of the subject's mind, like
the quest for objective evidence," ought to be subject to Fourth
Amendment standards. 3
Indeed, the kinship between Brown and Rochin is undeniable.3 4
They lie at the interface of the "due process" cases concerning
"hyper-intrusive" bodily searches and those addressing "hyper-
intrusive" searches of the mind. Rochin, after all, relied extensively
on Brown, citing the latter case for the proposition that it makes little
309. Uviller, supra note 282, at 1147; see also id. at 1168 (referring to interrogation as
an "ex parte mind probe").
310. Id. at 1176; see also Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 927 (equating interrogation
with a type of "search").
311. To some extent, the Court has recognized this. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573 (1980) (establishing heightened requirement for arrest in the home). In other
respects, however, the Court has failed to observe this hierarchy. See, e.g., Eric
Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REv. 869, 924-28
(1985) (arguing for heightened constitutional protection for "papers").
312. See Uviller, supra note 282, at 1169 (referring to the mind as a "specially shielded
province"); see also Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 925 (referring to a person's "soul"
to the same effect).
313. Uviller, supra note 282, at 1147. See also Schnapper, supra note 303, at 926
(arguing for special protection for private papers "as essentially unspoken thoughts that
had never left the bosom of the thinker").
314. See Yale Kamisar, Response, "On the 'Fruits' of Miranda Violations, Coerced
Confessions, and Compelled Testimony," 93 MICH. L.REV. 929, 949-52 (1995)(discussing
Rochin as an analogue to coerced-confession situation); Paulsen, supra note 110, at 430-31
("[O]utrageous police methods will invalidate a confession just as they will invalidate
other evidence."). It appears that three justices agree that a confession is coerced for due
process purposes only if the police use methods that "shock the conscience." See Chavez
v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2005 (2003)(plurality opinion of Thomas, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.)(utilizing 'shocks the conscience" standard to determine if
confession was coerced). This would be an extraordinary departure from prior cases,
which have found constitutional violations even on "less-than-shocking" facts. Herman,
supra note 28, at 749; accord Gardner, supra note 43, at 1297 n.123; Grano, supra note 43,
at 918-19.
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sense to prohibit "the police [from] extract[ing] by force what is in [a
person's] mind but [not from] extract[ing] what is in his stomach." '315
Of course, Rochin, like Brown, was technically a "due process" case,
not a "Fourth Amendment" case. Yet this was purely a matter of
timing. It was decided at a time when the strong form of "selective
and non-exclusive" incorporation ruled the day, and was authored by
the primary proponent of that view, Justice Frankfurter.316 However,
as the Court recently noted, if Rochin were decided today, it "would
be treated under the Fourth Amendment, [and] with the same
result." '317  Indeed, the point seemed almost incontrovertible-the
Court blithely pointed this out in a footnote that passed largely
unnoticed.3 8 Similarly, if Brown were decided today, it, too, should
be seen as a "Fourth Amendment" case.
And as the Court recognized early on in its coerced-confession
jurisprudence, there is little reason to draw the line at physical torture
designed at extracting the contents of a person's mind when
psychological methods can be just as effective at doing so. Moreover,
a "search" need not necessarily involve physical compulsion or even
physical contact. For example, a search can occur when the police use
"a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public
street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home.,
31 9
Similarly, highly intrusive methods of interrogation might constitute
an unreasonable search of the mind for evidence, despite the fact that
the interrogator never lays a hand on the suspect.
3 20
315. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
316. See id. at 169 (citing with approval the Palko formulation of selective and non-
exclusive incorporation).
317. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998).
318. As confirmation as to how the Court would today treat Rochin, one need go no
further than Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and its antecedent, Breithaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). Breithaupt, like Schmerber, concerned whether the taking
of a suspect's blood against his will violated the Constitution. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 433-
34. Yet in Breithaupt, the Court disposed of the Fourth Amendment and Self-
Incrimination claims in seven sentences; neither the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary
rule nor the Self-Incrimination Clause had been incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 434. The bulk of the opinion addressed Breithaupt's "primary assault
on his conviction," that the blood test violated his due process rights in the same way that
the pumping of Rochin's stomach violated his rights. Id. at 435-40. Fast-forward nine
years. The Schmerber opinion was Breithaupt's mirror image. Now it was the "due
process" claim that got short shrift, essentially foreclosed by Breithaupt. See Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 759-60 & n.4. Instead, the Schmerber Court spent most of its time addressing
the Fourth Amendment, see id. at 766-72, and Self-Incrimination Clause, see id. at 760-65.
319. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
320. Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 859 (explaining that pre-trial questioning of
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As in Rochin, Schmerber, and Winston, the degree and methods
of intrusion are critical. The mind, after all, "is not a proscribed
precinct, utterly inaccessible to the probes of law enforcement
people.""32 Just as the Court distinguished the "painful and intrusive
stomach pumping" in Rochin from the "quick and virtually painless
taking of a blood sample" in Schnerber,322 so too do courts distinguish
between a confession beaten from a suspect and one obtained
through civilized questioning. Thus, a reasonableness standard, as in
the more traditional Fourth Amendment context, seeks an
accommodation between the claim to "indefeasible control" by each
person "over his or her own personal preserves of the mind,"323 and
the genuine needs of law enforcement. 24
It is no coincidence that some have described one of the
underlying purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination as the
protection of privacy. For example, in Miranda, the Court spoke of
the privilege as a manifestation of "a 'right to a private enclave where
he may lead a private life,' 325 and of a government respect for "the
inviolability of the human personality., 326 Yet this comes dangerously
criminal suspect, pursuant to proposed supervised deposition scheme, might involve
"needlessly intrusive questioning, fishing expeditions, and offensive impositions upon a
person's body [that] raise obvious Fourth Amendment concerns"). With respect to
searches and seizures of "papers," Schnapper has writter: "Ultimately, courts must ask
whether the government has invaded the inner sanctum of ideas and emotions protected
by the Constitution, not whether the invasion was achieved by means other than actual
physical compulsion." Schnapper, supra note 303, at 927.
321. Uviller, supra note 282, at 1145.
322. Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 921.
323. Uviller, supra note 282, at 1146.
324. Id. at 1150 ("[O]ur enjoyment of privacy in our various storage compartments,
including the cerebral, is subject to reasonable intrusion.., for legitimate law enforcement
purposes.").
325. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391
(1957)).
326. Id. See also Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 925 (recognizing "a certain narrow
but important protection of 'mental privacy');Gardner, supra note 43, at 1316
("[A]ffronts to dignity and intrusions into personal privacy appear to be, on their face, the
very sorts of evils protected against by the Fifth Amendment privilege."); Erwin Griswold,
The Right to be Left Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 216, 223 (1960) (contending that the
animating principle behind the privilege is privacy and "the right to be left alone"). Some
commentators, particularly Professor Gerstein, contend that the privilege against self-
incrimination protects, not privacy or dignitary interests in general, but the specific
interest in determining for oneself whether and to what extent one will assume moral and
legal culpability for one's acts. See, e.g., Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-
Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343, 352-56
(1979).
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close to repeating the error of Boyd v. United States,327 that is, of
conflating Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns. It is the Fourth
Amendment, not the Self-Incrimination Clause, that is driven by
concerns over privacy and autonomy. After all, the Self-
Incrimination Clause applies only in "criminal proceeding[s]" while
the Fourth Amendment applies anytime the government "search[es]"
or "seiz[es].""32  Additionally, again, the Self-Incrimination Clause
applies only if and when the mind's evidence is used against its
creator in a judicial proceeding, whereas the Fourth Amendment
applies at the time of the government incursion.9 It would be more
accurate to say, as others have, that Fourth Amendment interests are
strengthened when they are reinforced by other constitutional
provisions, such as the Free Speech33 or Self-Incrimination Clauses.3"
Thus, where a search is likely to uncover self-incriminating thoughts
that might later be used against their "owner," such as a search of
private papers, the government must meet a heightened standard of
reasonableness. A search of the mind of a person suspected by the
State of criminal activity is the paradigm of such a search.
C. Modifying the Standard for Coerced Confessions
The question remains whether the old due process standard, with
its multifarious factors,, sufficiently reflects a Fourth Amendment
reasonableness inquiry so that it can be retained in its entirety, or
327. 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) ("[T]he 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned
in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to
give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment"). Boyd has fallen into disrepute with the Court, see Uviller, supra note 282,
at 1154, though it has its defenders in the academy. See, e.g., Schnapper, supra note 303, at
924.
328. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 890-91 (citing fact that privilege against
self-incrimination is unavailable to civil litigants, and witnesses in any case, and that it can
be trumped by immunity as belying notion that it is designed to protect privacy).
329. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259. 264 (1990) ("[A] violation of
the [Fourth] Amendment is fully accomplished at the time of an unreasonable
governmental intrusion.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
330. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); accord Schnapper, supra note 303,
at 925 (citing Stanford for proposition that Court has required special justification for
searches implicating First Amendment rights).
331. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 294, at 805-10 (arguing that Fourth Amendment
reasonableness should be informed by other constitutional principles where appropriate,
including principles underlying Self-Incrimination Clause); Schnapper, supra note 303, at
924-28 (contending that when courts consider reasonableness of search or seizure, they
ought to consider whether and to what extent objects of search contain self-incriminating
words).
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whether some modifications are necessary. Since Colorado v.
Connelly,332 the standard has focused on police misconduct, which
accords with a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.
However, even after Connelly, the Court has not had occasion to re-
state the standard in terms of the reasonableness of police conduct, so
it is unclear whether and to what extent the idiosyncratic
characteristics of the suspect are still relevant. After all, it is one
thing to establish some measure of coercive police tactics as a
threshold to finding a confession coerced, as Connelly did. It is quite
another to rule out any characteristics of the defendant in the overall
evaluation of a claim of coerciveness.
Still, Connelly did focus the inquiry on police misconduct, and
factors idiosyncratic to the individual suspect are not entirely
consistent with such an inquiry, except to the extent that they are
known to and acted upon by the police. Taking the lead from
Connelly, and from Joseph Grano's formulation of a due process
standard that anticipated a more objective approach, one can attempt
to articulate the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard. At the
same time, a separate Self-Incrimination standard must be
considered, for there might be cases (other than where statements are
un-Mirandized) where a confession has been "compelled" despite the
fact that the police acted reasonably.
1. A Proposed Fourth Amendment Standard for Coerced Confessions
Pursuant to a reasonableness standard, the courts should ask not
whether the circumstances surrounding the confession were coercive,
but whether they were unduly coercive. After all, under any type of
Fourth Amendment analysis, the touchstone is a careful balancing of
the right of the individual to privacy, autonomy, and dignity, on the
one hand, with society's need to gather evidence to help prosecute
and punish wrongdoers, on the other. One benefit of utilizing a
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis is the explicit
recognition of a necessary compromise between these competing
interests.333 Concomitantly, a reasonableness standard acknowledges
explicitly that a legal determination of whether a confession was
coerced is not based on an empirical assessment of whether the
332. 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986). See supra Part I.D.
333. See Grano, supra note 43, at 889-90 (noting that coerced-confession jurisprudence
mirrors society's simultaneous belief in two goals that "push in opposite directions":
effective law enforcement and fairness to the individual suspect).
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suspect's will was actually "overborne" or whether he exercised "free
will." Rather, the determination is fundamentally a normative
judgment about what police practices we as a society are willing to
allow and which ones we should forbid within varying factual
contexts. 3- By explicitly recognizing that the real issue is how much
police pressure we as a society are willing to countenance, and by
therefore framing the inquiry in objective terms, we encourage
principled decision-making by the courts.335
Thus, I propose, at least as a starting point, the test formulated
by Professor Grano in his influential work, Voluntariness, Free Will,
and the Law of Confessions.336 Operating within the old Due
Process/Self-Incrimination rubric, Grano proposed the following
objective test: a confession will be deemed coerced if is the product of
"interrogation pressures that a person of reasonable firmness, with
some of the defendant's characteristics, could not resist., 37  The
"person of reasonable firmness" standard shifts the emphasis from
the character of the suspect to the conduct of the police, who are
charged with the knowledge of the limits of reasonable human
resistance to pressure, as refined by court opinions. The focus is on a
relatively unchanging set of limitations, established by societal norms,
that the police may not transgress. However, some idiosyncratic
characteristics may be taken into account even pursuant to a
reasonableness standard. Grano elaborated that these include those
characteristics that are apparent to the interrogating officer(s),
"morally relevant" to the issue of coercion, and "not easily feigned or
difficult to verify." '338 While I would leave to judges and juries their
334. See id. at 884-86, 896, 904, 908. Grano contends that the existing coerced-
confession jurisprudence recognizes this functional approach, but only implicitly. Id. at
907-08.
335. See id. at 908.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 886-87, 898-909. Schulhofer, criticizes this test as failing to provide a
"principled basis" for case-by-case adjudication, and argues that an objective test is too
divorced from a true factual assessment to substitute for the traditional voluntariness test.
See Schulhofer, supra note 28, at 873-74. For example, he argues, "Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has long since diverged from weighing the totality of the facts to determine
whether a search was 'reasonable."' Id. at 876 n.51. However true this contention was in
1981 when Schulhofer wrote it, the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence now
embraces a "totality of the circumstances" standard to a very large extent. For example,
Schulhofer cited Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969), for this proposition,
but Spinelli and its doctrinal twin, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), were
overruled two years later by Illinois v. Gates, in favor of a "totality of the circumstances"
test. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).
338. Grano, supra note 43, at 900-06.
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traditional role in determining whether a suspect was feigning such
characteristics as mental retardation or intoxication, I agree with
Grano as to the first two factors.
Pursuant to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness test, it is
crucial that any idiosyncratic characteristics of the suspect, in order to
be taken into account, be apparent or otherwise known to those
charged with the duty of acting "reasonably." Indeed, the Connelly
Court made clear that a suspect's mental illness or intoxication was a
factor used in prior cases only to the extent that the police either
created or were aware of and exploited the condition."' Similarly, a
suspect's level of intelligence or education should be taken into
account only to the extent that the interrogators know of and exploit
these characteristics. But certain characteristics of the suspect, such
as his age and general physical condition, will always be apparent.
Grano's "moral relevance" requirement reminds us of the goal of
the inquiry and puts a reasonable limit on the types of idiosyncratic
factors to be taken into account: only those that reasonable people
would agree could lead to an undesirable level of infringement on a
person's mental freedom. Thus, a person's overall mental or
psychological state-again, if known to the police-would generally
fit this category, since most reasonable people would likely reel at the
thought of State officials taking advantage of mental invalids or
persons of sub-normal intelligence. Age, too, would be a factor in
many cases, for the same reason: a general and widespread distaste
for the exploitation of the very old or the very young.340
Race, and for that matter, gender, are factors that will ordinarily
be apparent to interrogators and that will sometimes be relevant.
Many of the older cases appear to have used race as a factor under
the assumption, no doubt true in nearly all of those cases, that the
African-American suspect was interrogated by a coterie of white
police officers. As the Court realized, the racial dynamic in the
interrogation room can have a powerful impact on the suspect, a
circumstance the police might be tempted to use to their advantage,
especially in the 1950s and 1960s, but even so today. By like token, a
squadron of large, male detectives might readily exploit gender
distinctions in interrogating a lone female suspect. One need not
subscribe to outmoded chivalric attitudes to recognize that the types
339. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164-65 (1986).
340. Of course, one reason for this general distaste might be that the resulting
confessions are less trustworthy. See White, supra note 72, at 1232. However, it is likely
based also on a visceral reaction to the police practices themselves.
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of pressure and tactics reasonable people would approve in the
questioning by male interrogators of a male suspect might be
unreasonable when applied to a female suspect. On the other hand,
the influx of women and, especially, racial minorities into the Nation's
police forces have lessened, though certainly not eliminated, the
danger that police will exploit racial and gender dynamics to their
own advantage. Thus, each case must be examined on its own to
determine whether these characteristics of the suspect are relevant.
Given the Fourth Amendment's avowed purpose of balancing
individual interests with societal needs, I would add to Grano's
formulation two considerations: the police need for the evidence and
the extent to which exigent circumstances are present. That the need
for the evidence should be taken into account comes directly from
Winston, where the Court weighed the highly intrusive nature of the
search against the fact that the police already possessed sufficient
evidence of the suspect's involvement in the crime." Similarly, where
the police already have substantial evidence of the suspect's guilt, or
where such evidence is easily obtainable, the necessity for a
confession is lessened, and so "hardball" tactics during interrogation
need not be countenanced. On the other hand, where the police have
sufficient reason to believe that the suspect committed a crime but it
is based solely on weak or circumstantial evidence, and it appears
likely that the case cannot be prosecuted without something more,
police should be freer to resort to some tactics that might in other
contexts be deemed coercive.342
This idea is nothing new. The Court itself flirted briefly with it in
Haynes v. Washington,343 where it found that the State's actions,
already determined by the Court to have been coercive, were all the
worse from a constitutional perspective because they were hardly
necessary. The Court wrote:
[T]he coercive devices used here were designed to obtain
admissions which would incontrovertibly complete a case in
which there had already been obtained, by proper
investigative efforts, competent evidence sufficient to obtain
a conviction. The procedures here are no less
341. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-65 (1985). I would not, as the Court did,
rely on the circular logic that since the police have sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the search, the search is probably unnecessary. See supra note 265.
342. But see Greenawalt, supra note 197, at 42-43 (arguing on moral grounds that the
right to silence is stronger when police have less independent inculpatory evidence).
343. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
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constitutionally impermissible, and perhaps more
unwarranted because so unnecessary. There is no reasonable
or rational basis for claiming that the oppressive and unfair
methods utilized were in any way essential to the detection
or solution of the crime or to the protection of the public.344
A reasonableness approach to coerced confessions would pick up on
the thread left dangling in Haynes.
Additionally, in the rare case, police should be permitted to take
into account any exigent circumstances that might exist. Thus, where
a kidnapping suspect is questioned, and the interrogators have reason
to believe that the victim is still alive, more vigorous tactics and
questioning might be reasonable under the circumstances in order to
maximize the chances of the victim's safe return.345  Similar-and
perhaps most relevant in a post-September 11 legal culture-is the
"ticking time bomb" case, where an explosive device is set to be
detonated and police have probable cause to believe the suspect in
custody knows where it is, when it will detonate, and how it can be
disarmed.346 Or the "ticking time bomb" is a group of the suspect's
confederates, not yet apprehended, who are planning a terrorist
attack. It seems reasonable that different and more flexible
interrogation methods should be open to the police in such a situation
than if they were investigating a completed crime.
Again, this idea is nothing new. Taking into account exigent
circumstances is a common staple of current Fourth Amendment
doctrine, which is unsurprising given the focus of the analysis on
"reasonableness." '347 While it appears that the Court has never
invoked exigency as a justification for an otherwise actually coercive
interrogation, it held in New York v. Quarles, in effect, that exigency
will render irrelevant the presumptive coerciveness inherent in an
interrogation and thus excuse the lack of Miranda warnings and
waiver.348 In Quarles, police were told by a woman that a man with a
344. Id. at 519.
345. See Loewy, supra note 184, at 925 ("[IJn a true emergency ... the police are, or
ought to be, at their coercive best .... ).
346. This example comes from New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Clymer, supra note 28, at 549-50.
347. See, e.g., Illinois v. MacCarthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331(2001) (stating that potentiality
for loss of evidence sometimes constitutes exigent circumstances justifying failure to
obtain search warrant); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (suggesting that
"exigent circumstances" may excuse failure to obtain warrant for in-home arrest).
348. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1984).
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gun who had just raped her had then entered a supermarket. 49 When
cornered in the supermarket and apprehended, the suspect was found
to have an empty shoulder holster.350 Without reading him his
Miranda rights, an officer asked where the gun was and the suspect
responded, "'the gun is over there.""'3 " The Supreme Court held that
"there is a 'public safety' exception to the requirement that Miranda
warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into
evidence., 352  Using the same cost/benefit analysis employed in
determining whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
should be employed in a particular instance, the Court determined
that the cost of adhering to Miranda's strictures where the public
safety is imminently threatened outweighs the benefits of guarding
against compelled self-incrimination.353 Both the statement and the
gun itself were admissible.
This "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule can easily be
applied to the context of coerced confessions. To heighten the sense
of exigency, suppose that the police know a suspect has ditched his
gun, not in a supermarket, but near a school for developmentally
disabled children, as in Rhode Island v. Innis.354 Suppose further that
the officer quickly reads the suspect his Miranda rights, the suspect
waives them, and the officer immediately grabs him by the shirt collar
and screams, "Where's the gun!" three times before the suspect
answers. Now suppose instead that after the Miranda waiver, the
officer grabs the suspect by the neck, bends him over the hood of the
patrol car, and repeatedly screams in his ear, "Where's the gun!"
Finally, assume instead that following the Miranda waiver, the officer
calmly takes out his service revolver, cocks it, holds it to the suspect's
head and says, "Tell me where the gun is or I'll blow your head off."
It seems to me that, under these circumstances, the officer in scenario
one is probably acting reasonably, the officer in scenario three is
almost certainly acting unreasonably, and the officer in scenario two
is very close to the line. Of course, exigency is a sliding scale, and
what is unreasonable where the danger is "merely" a loaded weapon
abandoned in a public place might be appropriate in a "ticking time
bomb" case. Yet, regardless of what the answer is in any particular
349. Id. at 651-52.
350. Id. at 652.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 655-56.
353. Id. at 656-58.
354. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
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case, by focusing on the reasonableness requirement in light of the
exigent circumstances present, rather than on whether police conduct
overbore the suspect's will in some abstract sense, we are at least
asking the right question.
2. A Proposed Self-Incrimination Standard for Coerced Confessions
A Fourth Amendment test is not, however, the end of the
inquiry. That Amendment is implicated when the confession is taken,
but the Self-Incrimination Clause is implicated if and when the
confession is admitted into evidence at the defendant's trial. Given
this, one must also consider whether the above approach is consistent
with a defendant's Self-Incrimination rights.35 To put it another way,
can a confession ever be deemed reasonably obtained pursuant to the
above approach but still compelled within the meaning of the Self-
Incrimination Clause?
In the run of cases, the two standards ought to be coextensive.
Asking whether "a person of reasonable firmness," with those of the
defendant's idiosyncratic characteristics known to the police and
relevant to the inquiry, could have resisted the particular
"interrogation pressures" used seems to be appropriate regardless of
whether the touchstone is the reasonableness of the police conduct or
whether a statement was compelled.
However, the "person of reasonable firmness" test assumes a
baseline of no especial need for a confession and no exigent
circumstances. Where police tactics are deemed reasonable only
because of an especially great need for the evidence or because of
exigent circumstances, any resulting statement must still be
considered compelled. After all, if application of this baseline test
reveals that a "person of reasonable firmness" would have succumbed
to "interrogation pressures," it can hardly be said that the suspect was
not "compelled." That the police conduct was nonetheless
reasonable because of other considerations over and above the
baseline circumstances does not alter this conclusion of compulsion.356
355. Ironically, the ruling in Graham v. Connor may have been motivated, in part, by a
desire to achieve efficiency by obviating the need for dual, and possibly inconsistent,
standards. 490 U.S. 386 (1989); see Massaro, supra note 19, at 1118. Here, Graham
operates to achieve just the opposite. By removing the "due process" facade of coerced-
confession jurisprudence, it reveals and uncouples the two separate constitutional
provisions actually driving that jurisprudence: the Fourth Amendment and the Self-
Incrimination Clause.
356. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment's
strictures, unlike the Fourth's, are not removed by showing reasonableness.").
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Thus, going back to our first Quarles/Innis hypothetical,357 the fact
that it may have been reasonable under the circumstances for the
officer to shake the suspect by his shirt collar and scream in his face
does not mean that the suspect was not, in a very real sense,
compelled to answer.
Likewise, an un-Mirandized statement should be considered
compelled for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause but should
not be considered the product of unreasonable police conduct. The
Miranda doctrine is based on the conclusion that custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive.358 By definition, however, the
"inherent" coerciveness of police detention and questioning is not a
result of police misconduct. After all, as the Miranda Court
recognized, custodial police interrogation is a necessary and valuable
aspect of law enforcement. Moreover, as the Court also recognized in
subsequent cases, the giving of warnings and obtaining of a waiver in
and of themselves are not constitutionally required. The only
constitutional requirement is that any statement not preceded by the
warnings and waiver must be excluded from evidence. 59 The fact that
this occurs, however, does not mean that the police have acted
unreasonably.36 °
Thus, the Court's decision in Quarles, insofar as it allowed into
evidence the suspect's un-Mirandized statement, was incorrect.36' The
decision by police in that case not to administer warnings before
interrogation was undoubtedly reasonable. Indeed, the police might
have gone further and still acted reasonably.3 62 However, irrespective
of the reasonableness of the police action in that case, the suspect's
answer was presumptively coerced, a la Miranda. Thus, invocation of
the sort of cost/benefit analysis utilized when addressing the
operation of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule was
misplaced in the face of the clear command of the Self-Incrimination
Clause that no person be "compelled ... to be a witness against
himself.3 163 Whether the gun was properly admitted into evidence
357. See supra text accompanying notes 339-46.
358. See supra text accompanying note 79.
359. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000) (reaffirming that
Miranda states the constitutional rule "that unwarned statements may not be used as
evidence in the prosecution's case in chief").
360. See infra text accompanying notes 363-366.
361. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes
340-45.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 341-45.
363. See infra text accompanying notes 361-62, 383-86; see also Clymer, supra note 28,
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remains to be seen.
D. Impeachment and Fruits
One might ask why it matters that we distinguish between
confessions that are compelled within the meaning of the Self-
Incrimination Clause and that are also products of unreasonable
police conduct in violation of the Fourth Amendment, on the one
hand, and those that are compelled but that result from police
practices that are reasonable on the other hand. So long as one or
other constitutional provision is implicated, use of the confession at
trial violates a defendant's constitutional rights. The observation is
valid as far as it goes. If the focus is on the confession itself, use of it
at trial in the prosecution's case-in-chief violates the Self-
Incrimination Clause, irrespective of whether the Fourth Amendment
has also been violated.
However, aside from the fact that the law ought to make sense,"'
one must also look to two other possible uses of the confession-as a
means of obtaining other evidence and as impeachment of the
defendant at trial-to determine whether a dual-standard approach
has any real-world implications. With regard to the first
consideration, the "fruits" of confession evidence, the approach
outlined in this Article is largely consistent with what the Court has
already done and demonstrates that there is an important real-world
consequence of distinguishing between interrogation techniques that
violate the Fourth Amendment and those that do not. With regard to
impeachment, however, the distinction is unimportant: so long as the
statement is compelled, it should not be used to impeach its maker in
court. To the extent that the Court allows un-Mirandized statements
to be used for impeachment, I submit that the Court has got it wrong.
1. The Tainted Fruit of the Coerced Confession
Again, a coerced confession violates the Fourth Amendment
when it is taken and the Fifth Amendment only if and when it is used
at trial, while an un-Mirandized confession violates the defendant's
rights only when it is used against him. This goes a long way toward
explaining at least one seeming anomaly in the law better than the
Court has done: It explains why the "fruit of the poisonous tree" of an
un-Mirandized statement is much more easily washed of its taint than
at 550.
364. See Loewy, supra note 184, at 939 ("[T]he Court ought to understand what it is
doing.").
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when the fruit springs from the poisoned soil of actual coercion. In
Michigan v. Tucker,365 the progenitor of this rule, the Court itself
offered two explanations, neither of which is very persuasive. First,
the Court there wrote that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are
"not themselves rights protected by the Constitution." '366 Yet the
Court has recently reaffirmed that Miranda does indeed set forth a
rule of law of constitutional dimension.367 The Tucker Court also used
a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule model to determine that
extending the exclusionary rule of Miranda to cover the fruits of an
un-Mirandized statement would exact costs on society that outweigh
its benefits.36 However, the Self-Incrimination Clause, unlike the
Fourth Amendment, is not made effective by an extra-constitutional
exclusionary rule-it contains its own exclusionary rule.369 That is,
while the Fourth Amendment describes the right and the judge-made
exclusionary rule prescribes the remedy, the Self-Incrimination
Clause does both simultaneously. Accordingly, to whatever extent a
cost/benefit calculus is appropriate where the issue is remedying a
Fourth Amendment violation, such an analysis is wholly inapt in the
context of Miranda, which is grounded in the Self-Incrimination
Clause.'
The real answer is much simpler. Miranda's "core ruling [is] that
unwarned statements may not [constitutionally] be used as
evidence."37' Thus, while Miranda set forth a prophylactic regime, a
failure to follow that regime is not a "violation" of anything in the
Constitution. That is, it is not an act of wrongdoing on the part of the
police. Failure to give the warning or obtain the waiver prescribed by
Miranda ought to be described in wholly consequentialist rather than
normative terms: such a "failure" simply means that any resulting
statement cannot be used later against the suspect at trial.' In
365. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
366. Id. at 444.
367. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437-44.
368. 417 U.S. at 446-48,450-51.
369. See KAMISAR, supra note 306, at 987; Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely,
Comment, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of
the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1214 (1971); Gardner, supra note 43, at
1309 n.222; Loewy, supra note 184, at 926.
370. See Clymer, supra note 28, at 541.
371. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443-44.
372. See Loewy, supra note 184, at 915 ("[C]ourts should not care whether or not
Miranda is violated so long as no evidence obtained from the violation is introduced
against the person from whom it was obtained.").
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essence, when a police officer conducts a custodial interrogation
without adhering to Miranda, he is informally granting the suspect
374immunity.3"3 It does not mean that he has done anything wrong.
Indeed, police might sometimes intentionally render immunity
informally, and societal benefits might sometimes flow from such an
informal grant of immunity, as they do from formal grants. Sixteen
years ago, Professor Uviller reported on the phenomenon of the
"reverse Miranda warning" used by police after a suspect claim[s] his
privilege of silence or requested help from a lawyer: You have
asserted your rights under Miranda. That means that anything you
say now can never be used against you, do you understand? Now
having been advised of your rights, will you tell me what happened.375
373. Gardner, supra note 43, at 1306 ("[C]ontinued interrogation after assertions of
Miranda rights might just as easily be viewed as informally granting the suspect limited use
immunity."). Ritchie appears to deserve the credit for equating a variance from Miranda
with an "informal" grant of immunity. See Ritchie, supra note 28, at 413. Cf Amar &
Lettow, supra note 92, at 900, 916 n.249 (stating that, after Miranda, "any compelled self-
incriminating statement, whether inside or outside a courtroom, would automatically
trigger immunity"). Kamisar refers to "unintentionally" granted immunity, KAMISAR,
supra note 306, at 988-89, but it is not necessarily granted unintentionally in all cases. See
infra text accompanying notes 367-69. Loewy, Kamisar, and Ritchie assumed that the
immunity granted would be "use-plus-derivative-use," since such immunity currently is
required by a formal grant. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Amar &
Lettow, supra note 92, at 877-80. I agree that "formal" and "informal" immunity should
be coextensive, but argue that simple use immunity makes more sense from a textual point
of view. See infra text accompanying notes 370-73.
374. Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2004 (2003) (plurality)("Chavez's failure to
read Miranda warnings to Martinez did not violate Martinez's constitutional rights...); id.
at 2013 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)("[F]ailure to give a
Miranda warning does not, without more, establish a completed violation when the
unwarned interrogation ensures."); See alsoKamisar, supra note 306, at 1009 (stating that
the Court held in Elstad that "a victim of -,Miranda violation 'has suffered no identifiable
constitutional harm"') (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985)); Clymer, supra
note 28, at 534 ("A police officer who disregards Miranda does nothing wrong.");
375. Uviller, supra note 282, at 1141. Of course, telling the suspect that his words "can
never be used against" him presents some difficulty since they can currently be used for
impeachment pursuant to Harris v. New York. 401 U.S. 222, 224-26. Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (holding that it would be fundamentally unfair to imply to a suspect
that his silence cannot be used against him and then to use it to impeach him); see Harris,
401 U.S. at 224-26. As I argue, however, Harris should be overruled. See infra text
accompanying notes 387-92.
More recently, Professor Weisselberg has written on the similar phenomena, which he
claims is widespread, of "questioning outside Miranda." See generally Charles D.
Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121 (2001); Charles
D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998). See also State v.
Seibert, 93 S.W. 3d 700, 704 (Mo. 2002)(describing "two-step interrogatory technique
designed to elicit an initital confession before reading the accused her rights, hoping that
she would repeat that confession.") cert granted 123 S.Ct. 2091 (2003). Weisselberg argues
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Police might take this course of action when, for example, they
have sufficient evidence against one individual and seek evidence
against an accomplice,376 or simply for "corroboration of their
suspicion[s]" or for a "personal sense of completion., 377
Seen in this light, it becomes clear why the fruits of un-
Mirandized confessions should be admissible at trial. They simply are
not the product of an unconstitutional or otherwise illegal action.
Again, the Constitution is not violated unless and until a "compelled"
statement is introduced against the defendant in a criminal judicial
proceeding. If that never happens, there simply is no "poisonous
tree," so there can be no "tainted fruit." Thus, the fruits of un-
Mirandized confessions ought to be admissible at trial.
Amar and Lettow have come to a similar conclusion but from a
different direction. They have proposed a universal rule of simple use
immunity, as distinguished from "use-plus-derivative-use" immunity:
where a suspect is compelled to speak against himself, whether
because his confession is coerced in a station house or because he is
formally granted immunity by a Grand Jury or Congressional
Committee, the Self-Incrimination Clause is satisfied as long as the
statement itself is not admitted at trial, even if its fruits are.378 But this
solution is not completely satisfying. If, as Amar and Lettow
concede, "[o]ur main concerns today should still be protecting against
third-degree tactics and assuring reliability in evidence,"37 9 mere use
immunity gets us only halfway there. It is responsive to the latter,
subordinate concern but not the former, primary concern, for police
will still be inclined to use the "third degree" if they know that the
fruits of any confession will be admissible even if the confession itself
is not." Even assuming that reliability-enhancement is the driving
force behind the Self-Incrimination Clause, where police use tactics
that violate a separate constitutional norm-the Fourth
that this is an abusive police practice. However, if the police are not being unduly
coercive, they do not violate the plain terms of the Self-Incrimination Clause so long as no
statements thereby induced are used against the suspect at trial. See Clymer, supra note
28, at 524.
376. See Loewy, supra note 184, at 920-22; Uviller, supra note 282, at 1144 n.19.
377. Uviller, supra note 282, at 1141.
378. Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 858-59, 911.
379. Id. at 865 (emphasis added); see also id. at 874-75 n.63 ("unregulated police-
station coercion is often bad in itself"); id. at 894 ("Courts have.., rightly shown
considerable concern for deterring improper police practices").
380. See Kamisar,. supra note 306, at 976, 980, 994-95, 1000.
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Amendment-reliability-enhancement is not the main concern.""
Punishing and deterring such police action is.
Thus, absent an accompanying Fourth Amendment violation,
mere use immunity makes sense when a suspect is compelled to speak
via a grant of immunity, whether formally as in a Congressional
hearing or Grand Jury, or informally as in a custodial interrogation
without benefit of Miranda warnings." Where, however, a coerced
confession is concerned, there is a separate Fourth Amendment
violation and the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine should apply
with full force, resulting in exclusion of both the confession and its
fruits.3 83
Returning to our first Quarles/Innis hypothetical," let us assume,
as I first proposed, that a court would find the police officer's actions
(shaking the suspect by the shirt collar while screaming in his face,
"Where's the gun!") reasonable under the circumstances (an
abandoned, loaded weapon near a school for developmentally
disabled children). The suspect's hypothetical answer (say, "Right
behind the bushes") should be suppressed, not because the police
have unreasonably seized him or unreasonably searched his mind for
evidence, but rather because the answer was indisputably
compelled." Yet because there is no Fourth Amendment violation,
suppression of the statement is all that is required to satisfy the
Constitution. The gun itself is not tainted and it may be introduced
into evidence. This is precisely the result Justice O'Connor would
have reached in Quarles.386
381. See supra text accompanying notes 198-201.
382. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 883 n.109 (noting that the arguments
supporting pure use immunity in the Miranda context, as articulated by Justice O'Connor
in her separate opinion in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 665-74 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), apply equally whenever the
Self-Incrimination Clause is implicated).
383. Although Amar and Lettow reject the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
under all circumstances, see Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 894 & n.169 (citing Amar,
supra note 277, at 811-19), they recognize that some might disagree on this point but agree
with their general argument that fruits of compelled speech are generally admissible. In
that case, "fruits of police brutality should be suppressed," but fruits of more "civilized"
compulsion should not. Amar & Lettow, supra note 281, at 1014 n.11. This is my
argument precisely.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 341-346.
385. See Clymer, supra note 28, at 550.
386. 467 U.S. at 665-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Clymer comes to no definitive conclusion as to the appropriate fate of
the gun. See Clymer, supra note 28, at 540-48.
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2. Using the Coerced Confession for Impeachment
On the other hand, viewing a coerced confession as both the
product of a Fourth Amendment violation and a potential Fifth
Amendment violation also creates a different anomaly calling for re-
examination. A defendant now may be impeached at trial with his
un-Mirandized confession, on the theory that this does not violate the
Self-Incrimination Clause.387  A defendant may also be impeached
with physical evidence that constitutes the product of an illegal search
or seizure, on the theory that the deterrence rationale of the
exclusionary rule would not be advanced by exclusion in those
circumstances.3" Why, then, may a coerced confession, which should
be seen as implicating both the Fourth Amendment and the Self-
Incrimination Clause never be used for impeachment?3.9  If a
testifying defendant may not use either the Fourth or Fifth
Amendment "shield" as a "sword" by testifying contrary to either a
prior statement or physical evidence without fear of impeachment,
there seems little reason to accept the combination of the two as
sufficient to provide him with such a valuable weapon.
The Court has explained that exclusion of physical evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is required only
when the incremental deterrence value of the exclusion in a particular
context outweighs its probity as evidence.3'9 This is because the
exclusionary rule is a remedial device designed to enforce the
substantive rights created by the Fourth Amendment.39' In the
context of use of the evidence for impeachment, the Court has ruled,
the probative value of the evidence is high, especially given its
inherent reliability,9 while any incremental deterrent effect of
applying the exclusionary rule would be minimal.393 However, again,
the Self-Incrimination Clause is, in and of itself, an exclusionary
rule. 94 Thus, the Self Incrimination Clause bars use of a coerced
387. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 224-26 (1971); supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
388. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980); see Walder v. United States,
347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
389. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,399-401 (1978).
390. See Loewy, supra note 184, at 909.
391. See id. at 910.
392. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 924 ("[T]he Supreme Court's repeated
emphasis on trustworthiness has led it to sharpen the difference between testimony and
physical evidence.").
393. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980).
394. See supra text accompanying notes 341-343.
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confession, which would cause the defendant to be a "witness against
himself," regardless of the deterrent effect such exclusion might have.
It remains to be seen why a presumptively coerced confession
ought to be treated differently for impeachment purposes from an
actually coerced confession. In Harris v. New York, the Court,
relying heavily on Fourth Amendment case law, reasoned that in the
context at bar, the incremental deterrent effect of barring use of an
un-Mirandized confession for impeachment was outweighed by the
utility of the evidence.395 However, the Court failed to pay heed to
the language of the Self-Incrimination Clause and the fact that it
differs greatly from the Fourth Amendment. Again, one need not
determine whether a cost-benefit analysis dictates application of the
exclusionary rule to enforce the Self-Incrimination Clause, because
that Clause is self-executing. It contains its own exclusionary rule,
and exclusion of a defendant's compelled testimony from being used
"against him" is always required.3" After all, regardless of whether a
defendant's words are used in the prosecutor's case-in-chief or for
impeachment, such use makes the defendant a "witness against
himself."3'9
There is one plausible explanation for treating presumptively
coerced confessions differently from actually coerced confessions for
impeachment purposes: concerns about reliability. The Harris Court
added the proviso that un-Mirandized statements could be used for
impeachment so long as "the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies
legal standards."'3 9 The Court thus saw un-Mirandized statements as
395. 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971).
396. See Gardner, supra note 43, at 1289-91 (criticizing Harris, Tucker, and Quarles for
using Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule reasoning out of context); Loewy, supra note
184, at 925-26 (arguing that the Court's use of cost/benefit analysis in determining when
the exclusionary rule applies in Miranda context is illegitimate).
397. This assertion might require a rejection of the Court's determination in Tennessee
v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985), that when an out-of-court statement by a person who
does not testify at trial is used only for impeachment purposes, rather than for the truth of
the matter asserted therein, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated. The Court thus
held that only hearsay is covered by the Clause. This determination ignores the fact that
the rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause, while addressing related concerns,
are not coextensive. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980). Street is also not
supportable with reference to the plain language of the Confrontation Clause. A
"witness" is someone who gives testimony, and a witness who testifies live but only for
impeachment purposes is no less a "witness." Since the Court, correctly, has extended the
concept of "witness" to those who give statements out-of-court that are then used at trial,
it should not matter for Confrontation Clause purposes whether the statement is used in
the prosecutor's case-in-chief or only for impeachment.
398. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224.
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being just as trustworthy, in general, as objective, physical evidence.399
Aside from failing to take into account what the Self-Incrimination
Clause actually says, this approach also gives short shrift to Miranda's
conclusive presumption of coercion. If this presumption is to be
taken seriously, an un-Mirandized statement cannot automatically be
assumed to be sufficiently reliable to be used for impeachment.
Indeed, quite the opposite should be assumed. Thus, no statement
deemed to have been coerced-whether actually or presumptively-
should be used "against" its maker, in any form, even for
impeachment, when he is on trial in a criminal matter."
V. CONCLUSION
After Graham, the rule against coerced confessions must be
located, if possible, somewhere within the specific protections of the
Bill of Rights. Yet because the rule is multi-faceted and grows from
several different concerns, no single constitutional clause can do the
heavy lifting required. A "division of labor among constitutional
provisions" is in order."1 After all, as the Court has acknowledged,
"[c]ertain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can
implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands."' The
Court has long recognized, on an intuitive level at least, that the
process of wrenching a confession from an unwilling suspect, whether
through use of brute physical force or more subtle psychological
methods, "affect[s] more than a single right."' 3 Such a process is both
an affront to human dignity in and of itself, and it also renders the
resulting statement an instance of compelled self-incrimination if used
at trial. For awhile, the Court lumped these violations together under
the rubric of due process. In Malloy and Miranda, it recognized the
self-incrimination aspects of the phenomenon of coerced confessions,
but continued, and continues, to utilize the old "due process"
language in non-Miranda cases.
For good or ill, framing issues in terms of Fourteenth
Amendment "due process" is pass6 with the Court. More
399. See Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 361, at 1215 (arguing that it makes more sense
to allow physical evidence resulting from Fourth Amendment violation, than a statement
taken without Miranda warnings, to be used for impeachment, because the former is at
least reliable).
400. See Saltzburg, supra note 86, at 18-19 (arguing that Harris was wrongly decided).
401. Amar & Lettow, supra note 92, at 859.
402. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992).
403. Id.
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importantly, it is forbidden where more specific constitutional text
applies. It is time for the Court to acknowledge that when a suspect is
coerced into confessing, it is not general notions of due process that
are violated at the time of the confession. It is the Fourth
Amendment.
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